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The Brazilian Clean Company Act: 
Using Institutional Multiplicity for Effective Punishment 
 
Mariana Mota Prado* 
Lindsey Carson** 
Izabela Correa*** 
 
 
Abstract: In Brazil’s battle against corruption over the past two decades, there 
has been significant progress associated with the systems of oversight and 
investigation but very little progress in holding corrupt actors legally accountable 
for their transgressions. We suggest that until very recently this could be partially 
explained by the fact that there was institutional multiplicity (i.e. duplication of 
functions) in oversight and investigative institutions, while at the punishment 
stage, a single and underperforming institution – the judiciary – exercised 
monopolistic authority. To circumvent the limits associated with Brazilian courts, 
the government is increasingly relying on administrative sanctions for corruption. 
It is in this context that Brazil has enacted legislation to punish legal persons for 
both foreign and domestic corruption: the Clean Company Act (Lei Anti-
Corrupção), enacted in August 2013, has used institutional multiplicity in an 
attempt to circumvent the well-known problems that plague the Brazilian anti-
corruption system. We suggest that this looks promising, as it follows the same 
structure of recent reforms that have been successful in Brazil.  
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Introduction  
 
Brazil has grappled with corruption for most of its political history, but the issue 
has assumed a particularly prominent position in the country’s politics since its 
return to democracy. The democratic constitution enacted in 1988 laid the 
groundwork for the development of Brazil’s modern web of accountability 
institutions, including in the areas of oversight and investigation. Under the 
Constitution, the Federal Public Prosecutors’ Office (Ministério Público Federal, 
MPF) gained independence from the executive branch, emerging as the de facto 
“fourth branch of government,” empowered to act in the defense of the public 
interest. The MPF’s role as the primary enforcer of political law and protector of 
collective interests was further strengthened under the 1992 Administrative 
Improbity Law which granted the MPF enhanced authority to act against 
corruption and the misuse of public funds.1 The 1988 Constitution also conferred 
greater powers and responsibilities to the National Court of Accounts2 (Tribunal 
de Contas da União, TCU) and guaranteed rights to public information and 
freedom of press. These and other institutional reforms have strengthened the 
capacity of officials to detect and investigate corrupt activities, as demonstrated 
by the many high-profile scandals that have been uncovered during the terms of 
each of Brazil’s six post-authoritarian presidents. However, while the discovery 
and exposure of such numerous incidences of corruption attest to the competency 
and effectiveness of the country’s monitoring and investigative authorities, they 
also confirm that corruption remains deeply entrenched across all branches and 
levels of government in Brazil.  
 
Such endemic corruption has had negative consequences for democracy 
and has contributed to the erosion of public trust in Brazilian political institutions. 
Power and Taylor report that the Brazilian public’s confidence in politicians 
dropped from 31% in 1992 (during the run-up to impeachment of President 
Fernando Collor de Melo) to 8% in late 2005, while confidence in political parties 
plummeted from 26% to 9% over that same period.3 More recent surveys also 
indicate that trust in public institutions remains low and may be deteriorating. In 
the 2014 AmericasBarometer survey, for example, Brazilians reported the lowest 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Rogério B. Arantes, “The Federal Police and the Ministério Público,” in Timothy J. Power and 
Matthew M. Taylor (Eds), Corruption and Democracy in Brazil: The Struggle for Accountability 
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2011), Chapter 8. 
2 Also known as External Court of Accounts or Federal Audit Court. 
3 Timothy J. Power and Matthew M. Taylor, “Introduction: Accountability Institutions and 
Political Corruption in Brazil.” In Timothy J. Power and Matthew M. Taylor (Eds), Corruption 
and Democracy in Brazil: The Struggle for Accountability (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 2011), at 3. 
levels of support for the political system (37.6%) and the third-lowest levels of 
trust in local government (37.1%) among citizens from 28 countries in the 
Western Hemisphere.4 The 2014 Edelman Trust Barometer found that Brazil 
exhibits the largest gap between trust in business and government among the 
BRIC countries, with only 34% of Brazilians surveyed expressing confidence in 
their government compared with 70% who trusted business institutions; the report 
noted that the gap had widened since the previous year’s survey.5  
 
In addition, strong evidence indicates that the net effect of corruption on 
the country’s economic development has been negative. 6  While Brazil has 
experienced impressive economic growth in recent years,7 studies have estimated 
that corruption consumes between 1.4% 8  and 5% 9  of the country’s GDP, 
translating into economic losses of between US$31.4 billion to US$112.3 billion 
each year. Beyond its adverse impacts on the economy as a whole, corruption 
imposes real costs on Brazilian citizens; according to the statistical model used by 
Silva, Garcia, and Bandeira, if the level of corruption in Brazil had been as low as 
that in Denmark (the least corrupt country in their sample), per worker incomes 
would have been 43% higher in 1998, meaning that corruption led to 
US$2,840.81 in lost income for the average Brazilian worker that year.10 
 
It is interesting to note that the problem persists despite the existence of an 
extensive and robust framework of anti-corruption laws and regulations. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Elizabeth J. Zechmeister (Eds), “The political culture of democracy in the Americas, 2014: 
democratic governance across 10 years of the AmericasBarometer” (2014), online: Vanderbilt 
University 
<http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/ab2014/AB2014_Comparative_Report_English_V3_revised_01
1315_W.pdf >  at 191-222. 
5 Robert Holdheim, “Trust and the BRICs: going nowhere slowly?” Edeleman-blog (23 January 
2014), online: <http://www.edelman.com/post/trust-and-the-brics-going-nowhere-slowly/>. 
6 Robert Iquiapaza and Hudson Amaral, “Reflections on the impact of corruption on economic 
development: a literature review in the Brazilian economy” (2007) MPRA Paper No. 1818, online: 
<http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1818/>. 
7 Between 2000 and 2013, Brazilian GDP growth ranged from -0.3% (2009) to 7.5% (2010), with 
an average annual growth rate of 3.05%. The World Bank, “Development Indicators” (2015), 
online: <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx>. 
8 Federação das Indústrias do Estado de São Paulo, “Relatório Corrupção: custos econômicos e 
propostas de combate” (2010), online: <http://www.fiesp.com.br/indices-pesquisas-e-
publicacoes/relatorio-corrupcao-custos-economicos-e-propostas-de-combate/>. 
9 Época, “Por que o Brasil pode vencer a corrupção,” Revista Epoca - Special Debate Supplement 
(22 July 2008), online: <http://revistaepoca.globo.com/Revista/Epoca/1,,EMI5188-
15273,00.html>. 
10 Marcos Fernandes Gonçalves da Silva, Fernando Garcia and Andrea Camara Bandeira, “How 
does corruption hurt growth? Evidences about the effects of corruption on factors productivity and 
per capita income” (2001), online: 
<http://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/dspace/bitstream/10438/1953/1/TD103.pdf>. 
volume and scope of Brazil’s laws that comprise the anti-corruption framework 
are large, including provisions addressing conflicts of interest, public 
procurement, access to information, freedom of press and expression, and the 
powers and functions of the government Ombudsman.11 Leading anti-corruption 
non-governmental organizations have lauded the country’s anti-corruption 
legislative framework and heralded it as a model for other developing countries.12 
However, such accolades are generally based on assessments of countries’ formal 
anti-corruption policies and the existence of institutions charged with fighting 
corruption, rather than evaluations of how these corruption controls function in 
reality. The distinction is significant, as there may be sharp divergences between 
law on the books and law in action. Indeed, the available evidence from Brazil 
suggests that institutional barriers to accountability remain, preserving 
opportunities for malfeasance by public officials, particularly in political parties, 
the legislature, and local governments.13  
 
Despite these obstacles, empirical and anecdotal evidence indicate that 
some progress has been achieved in the battle against corruption in Brazil. In 
particular, the institutions charged with investigating suspected corrupt activities 
have performed strongly over the past decade, and, in another article, two of us 
argue that the explanation for the success of these government agencies appears to 
lie in their institutional arrangements. 14 Specifically, we contend that the overlap 
of anti-corruption functions among various governmental entities – “institutional 
multiplicity” – has strengthened outcomes by allowing institutions to compete, to 
collaborate, to complement one another, or to compensate for one another’s 
deficiencies or oversights. We assert that the Brazilian experience reveals the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Jeremy Pope, “Transparency International source book 2000: confronting corruption: the 
elements of a national integrity system” (2000), online: 
<http://archive.transparency.org/publications/sourcebook> . 
12 Global Integrity, “Global Integrity scorecard: Brazil 2009” (2009), online: 
<http://report.globalintegrity.org/reportPDFS/2009/Brazil.pdf>; Amarribo Brasil, “UN 
Convention against Corruption civil society review: Brazil 2012” (2012), online: 
<http://www.transparency.org/files/content/publication/206-brazil-full-report.pdf >; Frederick T. 
Stocker, “Anti-corruption developments in the BRIC countries: a MAPI series” (2012), online: 
<http://www.mapi.net/system/files/PA-107_2.pdf>.  However, while Brazil is generally regarded 
as having a strong legal and institutional anti-corruption framework, some gaps remain, 
particularly in the area of whistleblower protections.  See, e.g., Maíra Martini, “Brazil: Overview 
of Corruption and Anti-Corruption” (2014), online: 
<http://www.transparency.org/files/content/corruptionqas/Country_profile_Brazil_2014.pdf.>.  
13 Lindsey Carson and Mariana M. Prado, “Diagnosing the disease: Mapping corruption and its 
institutional determinants in Brazil” (2014) IRIBA Working Paper 08, online: 
<http://www.brazil4africa.org/publications/>. 
14 Mariana M. Prado and Lindsey Carson, “Brazilian Anti-Corruption Legislation and its 
Enforcement: Potential Lessons for Institutional Design” (2014), Journal of Self-Governance and 
Management Economics (forthcoming).  
advantages in pursuing alternative institutional approaches, including institutional 
multiplicity combined with institutional malleability, in developing effective 
strategies to reduce corruption. 
 
Building on those claims, this article focuses on institutional multiplicity 
at the adjudication and punishment stages – specifically, the establishment or 
strengthening of administrative and civil sanctions for corruption-related offenses 
by corporations – and argues that a strategy may confer particularly valuable 
benefits in environments in which conventional judicial institutions face severe 
problems of rigidity and overall inefficiency. Recent political developments in 
Brazil strongly suggest that the country’s executive and legislative officials were 
cognizant of the potential advantages of such a form of institutional multiplicity 
when designing a new punishment system for corporations involved in corruption. 
Specifically, the new Brazilian Clean Company Act (Law n. 12,846/13), enacted 
in August 2013 and in force since January 2014,15 relies heavily on administrative 
processes to impose sanctions on Brazilian companies involved in corruption 
either in Brazilian territory or in foreign countries. This reliance on administrative 
processes and sanctions creates an alternative way to investigate and punish 
corporations not relying uniquely on the Judiciary, as explicitly acknowledged in 
the justification for the Anti-Corruption Bill presented by the executive branch to 
the National Congress:  
 
The present bill opted for administrative and civil liability of legal 
persons, due to the fact that Criminal Law does not offer effective 
and speedy mechanisms to punish corporations, which are often 
the ones interested in and benefitting from corrupt practices. (…) 
The administrative process [was chosen], because it has revealed 
to be speedy and effective in deterring mismanagement in 
administrative contracts and procurement procedures, proving to 
be more able to provide fast responses to society.16 
 
As discussed in the academic literature and elsewhere in this article 
(section 2.2.3 infra), the Brazilian judiciary represents one of the most significant 
institutional barriers to holding individuals and legal persons accountable for their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 The statute is known in Portuguese as Lei Anti-Corrupção. The English language literature 
generally refers to the statute as the Clean Company Act, which better captures the fact that the 
statute is mostly focused on punishing companies for bribing government officials.  
16 Message 52 Executive to National Congress. EMI N. 00011 2009 – CGU/MJ/AGU, online: 
<http://www.camara.gov.br/proposicoesWeb/prop_mostrarintegra;jsessionid=519F1B865607F805
C445F533D460A0DE.proposicoesWeb2?codteor=735505&filename=Tramitacao-
PL+6826/2010>. 
corrupt activities.17 Thus, by creating an alternative pathway to investigation and 
punishment, we hypothesize that the new statute has the potential to overcome 
longstanding barriers to an effective accountability system for at least one 
category of corrupt actors: corporations and other legal entities. If successful in 
overcoming these barriers, the Brazilian Clean Company Act may prove to be an 
institutional development that could provide insights to other developing 
countries struggling with similar issues. 
 
To develop this claim, this article is divided in three parts. The first part 
provides a brief history of the Brazilian Clean Company Act and an overview of 
its main provisions. The second part analyzes in greater depth the administrative 
process for investigation and punishment in Brazil, emphasizing how institutional 
multiplicity seems to have strengthened the country’s anti-corruption system. 
Building on the institutional multiplicity hypothesis, the third part argues that by 
relying on administrative and civil processes and sanctions the new statute has the 
potential to effectively bypass the Brazilian judiciary, which currently represents 
one of the most important bottlenecks in the country’s anti-corruption system. We 
conclude by acknowledging that it is too early to assess the efficacy of the new 
Clean Company Act in deterring and sanctioning corruption. However, we 
suggest that, if our institutional multiplicity hypothesis proves correct, and the 
administrative liability regime created by the Clean Company Act proves 
effective in holding corrupt companies accountable, the Brazilian experience may 
provide a useful example for other countries in the Global South facing similar 
constraints. 
 
1. The Brazilian Clean Company Act 
 
Individuals engaged in corruption in Brazil can be subject to three types of 
punishment: administrative, civil and criminal.18 Each is determined by separate 
administrative or judicial processes that run independently of one another. While 
the Brazilian system to punish individuals involved in corruption schemes is quite 
robust, especially for public servants, until 2013 there was no express legal basis 
for extending strict liability for corruption-related offenses to legal entities, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 See section 2.2.3 infra. See also, Carlos H. R. Alencar and Ivo Gico Jr. “When crime pays: 
measuring judicial performance against corruption in Brazil” (2011), Law and Business Review of 
the Americas, v. 17; Matthew M. Taylor, “Veto and voice in the courts: policy implication of 
institutional design in the Brazilian Judiciary” (2006), Comparative Politics, v. 38, n. 3; Fausto M. 
Sanctis, “Recent legal and judicial reform initiatives in Brazil” (2013), International Judicial 
Monitor, Winter; Carson and Prado, supra note 13. 
18 Carson and Prado supra note 13. 
including corporations, whether committed in national or foreign territory.19 
Corporate liability was introduced for the first time in August 2013, with what 
became known in Brazil as Lei Anti-Corrupção or the Clean Company Act (Law 
n. 12,846/13).  
 
1.1 International Pressure for Legal Reforms  
 
Brazil’s decision to enact the new Clean Company Act reflects the convergence of 
long-standing obligations under international conventions and heightened 
attention from national and foreign media and civil society organizations in the 
lead-up to the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Summer Olympics. Focusing 
specifically on its international legal obligations, Brazil is a signatory to three 
multilateral anti-corruption conventions: the OECD Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD 
Convention);20 the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, enacted by 
the Organization of American States; 21  and the United Nations Convention 
Against Corruption (UNCAC).22 All three conventions require each state party to 
impose liability for corrupt acts on legal entities in a manner “consistent [in 
accordance] with its legal principles.” 23  Considering that the Brazilian 
Constitution only authorizes criminal responsibility of legal persons in cases 
involving environmental offenses, it would not be possible to impose criminal 
sanctions for corporations or other legal persons without a constitutional 
amendment. Hence, when Brazil revised its criminal code in 2002 to include the 
prohibition on transnational bribery, it included criminal sanctions only for 
individuals.24  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 However, prior to the enactment of Law 12,846, legal persons could potentially be held 
administratively liable for foreign bribery under other existing Brazilian laws governing public 
procurement, regulating publicly-held companies, etc. See: OECD Working Group on Bribery, 
“Brazil Phase 2: Report on The Application of The Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions and the 1997 Recommendation on 
Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions” (2007), online: 
<http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/39801089.pdf> at 51-53. 
20 Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998) [hereinafter OECD Convention] (ratified by 
Brazil in 2000). 
21 Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 
1996, 35 I.L.M. 724 (1997) [hereinafter IACAC] (ratified by Brazil in 2002). 
22 United Nations Convention against Corruption, Oct. 31, 2003, 43 I.L.M. 37 (2004), 2349 
U.N.T.S. 41 [hereinafter UNCAC] (ratified by Brazil in 2006). 
23 OECD Convention, supra note 20, at Art. 2; IACAC, supra note 21, at Art. VIII; UNCAC, 
supra note 22, at Art. 26. 
24 Interministerial Letter to the President arguing for the approval of the bill. EMI Nº 00011 2009 
– CGU/MJ/AGU, online: 
 
This gap in Brazilian anti-corruption legislation became especially 
apparent in 2010 after the evaluation of Brazil in the second phase of the 
monitoring process of the OECD Working Group on Bribery. This monitoring 
process is designed to determine whether a country has established the structures 
to enforce the laws and rules implementing the OECD Convention and to assess 
their application. In the case of Brazil, the monitoring team noted multiple 
deficiencies in the country’s anti-corruption laws,25 generating momentum and 
international pressure for a discussion about Brazil’s international obligations. 
This opened up the opportunity for the Executive Branch to send a bill addressing 
the corporate liability gap to Congress.  
 
1.2 The Brazilian Clean Company Act in Comparative Perspective 
 
The Clean Company Act extends civil and administrative liability to corporations 
and other legal persons for “acts committed against the domestic or foreign public 
administration,” including the bribery of foreign and domestic public officials, 
fraud in connection with public procurement activities, and obstruction of 
government investigations (Art. 5). This section assesses the Act against Brazil’s 
international obligations under the OECD Convention, UNCAC, and IACAC and 
provides a comparison of its terms with anti-corruption laws in other states party 
to one or more of those agreements. As these comparisons reveal, the Brazilian 
legislation is fundamentally similar to the anti-corruption laws in a range of other 
countries.  
 
However, the effectiveness of law depends not only on its content but also 
its enforcement. The OECD Working Group on Bribery explicitly addresses this 
potential gap between “law on the books” and “law in action” in the design of its 
country monitoring system, which assesses the adequacy of the anti-corruption 
legislation in its signatories but also their application of those laws. 26  As 
evidenced by the OECD’s peer monitoring reports, countries with similar laws 
may demonstrate enormous variability in their rates of enforcement of those 
laws.27 Thus, a doctrinal analysis and comparison of the content of the new 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
<http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/projetos/EXPMOTIV/EMI/2010/11%20-
%20CGU%20MJ%20AGU.htm>.  
25 OECD Working Group on Bribery, “Brazil Phase 2: Follow-Up Report on the Implementation 
of the Phase 2 Recommendations” (2010), online: <http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-
briberyconvention/45518279.pdf> at 35-41. 
26 OECD, “Country Monitoring of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention,” online: 
<http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/countrymonitoringoftheoecdanti-briberyconvention.htm> 
27 See, e.g., OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions, 
“Compilation of Recommendations Made in the Phase 3 Reports:  Implementation and 
Brazilian legislation can provide valuable information on the changes the law 
effects and how its provisions align or diverge from anti-corruption statutes in 
other countries. However, the ultimate effectiveness of the Anti-Corruption Law 
will largely depend on enforcement, which will in turn be influenced by 
institutional multiplicity, as we argue in the next section.   
 
 
a) Scope of the Bribery Prohibitions 
 
Brazil’s Clean Company Act prohibits the bribery of both foreign and domestic 
public officials.  While laws against the bribery of domestic officials have been 
common in countries around the world for decades if not centuries,28 prohibitions 
against foreign bribery are a more modern phenomenon. In 1977, the United 
States enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA),29 the world’s first law 
regulating the business conduct of domestic actors engaged in foreign markets 
with foreign officials. After decades of advocacy on the part of American officials 
and businesses and amid increased attention and pressure from civil society and 
the media, in December 1997, members of the OECD were joined by five other 
countries (including Brazil) in signing the Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. The OECD 
Convention, which came into force in February 1999 and requires states party to 
establish legally-binding standards to prohibit foreign bribery. Most signatories to 
the OECD Convention have opted to address foreign and domestic bribery in 
different sections of their legal codes,30 but Brazil’s unified approach is consistent 
with anti-bribery laws in several other states party, including Colombia, Germany, 
Portugal, and the United Kingdom (UK).31  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions and the 2009 Recommendations on Further Combating Bribery” (2014), 
online: < http://www.oecd.org/corruption/anti-
bribery/CompilationofRecommendationsP3ReportsEN.pdf>; OECD Working Group on Bribery in 
International Business Transactions, “Compilation of Recommendations Made in the Phase 2 
Reports” (March 2010). 
28 John T. Noonan Jr., Bribes: The Intellectual History of a Moral Idea (University of California 
Press, 1987). 
29 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 et seq. (2012). 
30 Rachel Brewster, “The Domestic and International Enforcement of the O.E.C.D. Anti-Bribery 
Convention” (2014) 15 Chicago Journal of International Law 84. 
31 OECD Working Group on Bribery, “Steps Taken by State Parties to Implement and Enforce the 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions” (2014), online: OECD <http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/WGB-Steps-Taken-
Update.pdf>.  
While UNCAC urges signatories to criminalize bribery in the private 
sector (commercial bribery) as well as the public sphere, 32  Brazil’s Clean 
Company Act’s prohibitions are limited to the bribery of public officials, though 
the law does prohibit fraud and manipulation by private companies when bidding 
on public contracts (Art. 5(IV)). However, many other UNCAC members, 
including Argentina, Ecuador, Japan, and Mexico, join Brazil in lacking specific 
laws that prohibit bribery among private parties, and in other countries, such as 
the United States and Australia, commercial bribery is regulated by a patchwork 
of federal and sub-national laws rather than a single statute.33    
 
A distinctive feature of the Clean Company Act is the explicit extension of 
its prohibitions on bribery to include third parties related to foreign and domestic 
public officials (Art. 5(I)). While authorities in other jurisdictions have publicly 
confirmed that an individual or legal person can be held liable under anti-bribery 
laws for advantages improperly conferred on a third party for the eventual benefit 
of a public official,34 only a handful of other countries, including Canada and 
South Korea, directly address payments made to family members of public 
officials.35  
 
Another notable feature of the Brazilian Clean Company Act is its lack of 
definition of “public official” in the text of the law itself.36 The law does define 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 UNCAC, supra note 22, at Art. 21. 
33 Sarah Clark, “New solutions to the age-old problem of private-sector bribery” (2013) Minnesota 
Law Review 97 at 2285-2319; Jones Day, “Anti-Corruption Regulation Survey of Select 
Countries” ( 2014), online: <http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/697734d5-7d1e-44ad-
9f90-0a919c43ac30/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ea6c2fe5-1944-470b-b634-
0c12b886b6bd/TOI_760138682_5_%5bFINAL%5d%20Anti-
Corruption%20Regulation%20Survey%202014.PDF>. 
34 Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice and the Enforcement Division of the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, “A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act” (2012), online: <http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-resource-guide.pdf>. 
35 Canadian Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c. C-46, §121; Choe Sang-Hun, “South Korea Tightens 
Rules Against Gifts to Fight Graft,” New York Times (3 March 2015), online: 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/04/world/asia/south-korea-seeking-to-curb-graft-passes-law-
restricting-gifts.html?_r=0>.  
36 The concept of foreign public official in Brazilian doctrine and jurisprudence is based on the 
mentioned long-established definition in Article 327 of the Penal Code, which provides: “For the 
purposes of criminal law, anyone who, even though temporarily or unpaid, performs a public job, 
position or function is deemed to be a public official. Paragraph 1. Anyone who performs a public 
job, or holds a function in a para-state body or who works for a service-providing company hired 
or contracted to carry out any typical activity in the Public Administration is also deemed to be a 
public official.” According to the OECD Phase I Monitoring Report, this definition of “public 
official” has been interpreted very broadly by Brazilian courts and doctrine, to cover anyone who 
exercises, in any way, a public function, online: <http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-
briberyconvention/33742137.pdf>.  
“foreign public administration” in detail, providing an arguably reasonable basis 
for extrapolating a general definition of “foreign public official,” but it is silent on 
the meaning of “domestic public administration” and thus provides no indication 
of which domestic actors fall within the scope of the bribery prohibition.37 The 
absence of a definition may present particular challenges in situations involving 
state-owned enterprises and other companies over which the government exerts 
some control, such as Petrobras, embroiled in a large corruption scandal at the 
time of this writing. In comparison, while ambiguity persists in varying degrees in 
the interpretation of the meanings and scope of the term “public official” under 
the laws of many other countries such as Canada, the US, and the UK, their anti-
bribery statutes do provide definitions of that term.38  
 
b) Forms of Liability 
 
In accordance with the UNCAC, OECD Convention, and IACAC, Brazil’s Clean 
Company Act establishes liability for legal entities, but that liability is 
administrative or civil, not criminal. While most signatories to the OECD 
Convention (as well as many other countries around the world) have adopted 
corporate criminal liability for bribery and other corruption-related offenses,39 
under Brazilian law, legal persons can only be held criminally liable in cases 
involving environmental offenses.40 However, Brazil’s exemption of corporations 
and other legal entities from criminal liability for corruption is consistent with its 
domestic legislation and with the approach taken under the anti-corruption laws of 
other states party to the OECD Convention (Bulgaria, Colombia, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Russia, and Turkey).41 Moreover, as discussed below, by imposing 
administrative liability on legal persons, the Clean Company Act allows Brazilian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 “Foreign public administration” includes any entity directly or indirectly controlled by the 
public administration of a foreign state as well as any public international organization.  Brazilian 
Law No. 12,846, of August 1, 2013, Art. 5(1)-(3). 
38 Bribery Act (2010) [UK], Art. 6(5); 15 U.S.C. §§78dd-1(f)(1), 78dd-2(h) (2), 78dd-3(f)(2); 18 
U.S.C. §201 (a); 18 U.S.C. §§666 (d)(1)-(4); Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act 
(CFPOA), S.C. 1998, c. 34, §2; Canadian Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c. C-46, §§120-123. 
39 OECD Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, “Liability of Legal 
Persons for Corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia” (2015), at 12. 
40 Brazilian Federal Constitution, Art. 225, paragraph 3; Brazilian Law No. 9605, February 12, 
1998. 
41 OECD Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, supra note 39, at Annex 
2.  In some countries, such as the US and Japan, legal persons can be held administratively or 
civilly liable as well as criminally liable in foreign bribery cases.  OECD Working Group on 
Bribery, “2013 Data on Enforcement of the Anti-Bribery Convention” (2014), online: OECD   
<http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Working-Group-on-Bribery-Enforcement-Data-2013.pdf> 
at 4-6. 
authorities to bring corruption cases in fora separate from the country’s inefficient 
judicial system.   
 
Corporate liability for offenses under the Brazilian Clean Company Act is 
strict, meaning that a company can be held administratively or civilly liable by 
merely showing that its employee, officer, director, or other agent committed a 
prohibited act in the company’s interest or for its benefit, without need to prove 
negligence or willful conduct or knowledge on the part of the legal entity (Art. 
2). 42  Similarly, the UK Bribery Act imposes strict liability on “relevant 
commercial organizations” that fail to prevent individuals “associated with” them 
from bribing so long as there is proof that a bribe was paid with the intention to 
obtain or retain business or a business advantage for the organization.43 In 
contrast, under the bribery laws of most other countries, including Canada and the 
United States, corporate liability only attaches if the individuals involved 
possessed the requisite mens rea,44 while in other jurisdictions, such as the 
Netherlands, authorities face a higher hurdle in imposing corporate liability as 
they must prove that an associated individual engaged in the bribery act with the 
view to induce a public official improperly and that the legal entity was aware of 
the transfer as well as the nature or purpose for which it was given.45 
 
c) Jurisdictional Reach 
 
UNCAC, the OECD Convention, and IACAC all oblige signatories to take 
measures to establish territorial jurisdiction over corruption-related offenses and 
further urge states parties to extend jurisdiction to offenses committed abroad by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 In its most recent assessment of Brazil’s implementation of the OECD Convention on Bribery, 
members of the OECD Working Group on Bribery reported that some of the anti-corruption 
officials, prosecutors, and lawyers with whom they spoke during their consultations and 
evaluation in Brazil emphasized that the strict liability provided under the Anti-Corruption Statute 
would not have been possible under a criminal law, which would have required proof of fault or 
intent on the part of the legal person and thus made it more difficult to hold companies legally 
responsible for corruption.  OECD Working Group on Bribery, “Phase 3 Report on Implementing 
the OECD Convention on Bribery in Brazil” (2014), online: <http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/Brazil-Phase-3-Report-EN.pdf> at 17 [hereinafter OECD Phase 3 Brazil Report].  
43 Bribery Act (2010) [UK], Art. 7. 
44 The US laws governing both foreign and domestic bribery require proof of corrupt intent, while 
the Canadian bribery law requires that the individual who committed the prohibited act “did so 
intentionally or recklessly, with knowledge of the facts constituting the offense, or with willful 
blindness toward them.”15 U.S.C. §§78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3; 18 U.S.C. §201; R v Sault Ste 
Marie, [1978] 2 SCR 1299 at 1309, 85 DLR (3d) 161. 
45 Bram Meyer, Tessa Van Roomen and Eelke Sikkema, “Corporate Criminal Liability for 
Corruption Offences and the Due Diligence Defence: A Comparison of the Dutch and English 
Legal Frameworks,” 10(3) Utrecht Law Review 37-54 (2014), online: Utrecht 
<https://www.utrechtlawreview.org/index.php/ulr/article/view/283/284> at 50. 
their nationals.46 The jurisdictional scope of Brazil’s Clean Company Act goes 
beyond these requirements and applies to Brazilian companies (regardless of 
corporate structure), foundations, and associations, as well as foreign companies 
active in Brazil through branches, subsidiaries, or representative offices, even if 
de facto or temporary (Art. 1).  
 
While most countries exercise jurisdiction over corruption-related offenses 
more narrowly,47 the extra-territorial reach of the Brazilian law and its broad 
application to non-Brazilian companies mirror the provisions of the UK Bribery 
Act concerning the “failure of commercial organizations to prevent bribery,” 
which apply not only to British companies and individuals, but also to foreign 
companies that carry on any “part of a business” in the UK.48 Thus, under both 
the Brazilian and UK laws, a multinational enterprise that has an office in São 
Paulo/London could ostensibly face prosecution in Brazil/the UK for bribery that 
occurred in a different country, even if no act or individual in Brazil/the UK was 
involved.  
 
d) Principles of Corporate Liability 
 
Consistent with the terms of the UNCAC, OECD Convention, and IACAC, under 
the Clean Company Act, legal persons can be held liable for misconduct 
committed by their agents or other intermediaries as well as by their employees, 
officers, and directors (Art. 5). The Act thus creates strong incentives for 
corporations to conduct thorough due diligence on and close scrutiny of any 
consultants, agents, or companies that they hire to act on their behalf. Brazil’s 
comprehensive approach to corporate liability brings it in line with the laws of 
most other signatories to the OECD Convention, although recent reports from the 
OECD Working Group do note that the application of foreign bribery laws to 
legal persons who use intermediaries is incomplete or unsettled in more than a 
dozen states party.49 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 UNCAC, supra note 22, at Art. 42; OECD Convention, supra note 20, at Art. 4; IACAC, supra 
note 21, at Art. V.  
47 For example, while the jurisdictional scope of the FCPA covers US persons – real and legal – 
when acting anywhere in the world, with respect to foreign corporations and individuals, liability 
only extends to issuers of US securities, or those who make corrupt use of US “mails or any means 
or instrumentality of interstate commerce” or commit any act in furtherance of bribery or 
attempted bribery of a foreign official while in US territory. 15 U.S.C. §§78dd-1(a), -1(g), -2(i), 
3(a), 78l, 78m(b)(2), 78o(d) (2012). Under the CFPOA, non-Canadian companies can be held 
liable only under territorial jurisdictional principles, which require a “real and substantial” 
connection between the alleged offense and Canada. R v. Libman [1985] 2 SCR 178, 21 DLR 
(4th) 174 (Supreme Court of Canada). 
48 Bribery Act (2010) [UK], Art. 7. 
49 OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions (2014), supra note 27. 
 
With regard to corporate transactions, the Clean Company Act specifically 
states that liability under the law is unaffected by changes in corporate ownership, 
although it limits the magnitude of the potential fine in such cases to the amount 
of the assets transferred in the merger or acquisition (Art. 4). While criminal and 
civil successor liability is consistent with general corporate law principles in 
common law countries, successor liability in civil law jurisdictions is typically 
restricted to civil liability for fines, disgorgement, and similar financial penalties, 
ordered by court decision before the merger or acquisition.50  
 
e) Enforcement Authority and Procedures 
 
For cases involving the bribery of domestic officials, Chapter IV of the Clean 
Company Act lays out a basic framework for administrative proceedings, but the 
specific procedures for imposing corporate administrative liability are articulated 
in Decree No. 8,420,51 which was signed by President Dilma Rousseff on March 
18, 2015 and took effect the following day. Pursuant to the Decree, violations of 
the Act shall be investigated and adjudicated through an administrative liability 
proceeding (Processo Administrativo de Responsabilização, or PAR proceeding). 
Generally the highest authority of the public entity against which the wrongful act 
was allegedly committed will have jurisdiction over the PAR proceeding, but, 
under certain conditions, the Controladoria-Geral da União (Office of the 
Comptroller General of the Union, CGU) holds concurrent jurisdiction to initiate 
and conduct PAR proceedings.  Circumstances under which the CGU may 
exercise this discretionary jurisdiction include when the public entity lacks 
objective conditions to conduct the PAR proceeding, the issues involved are 
highly complex, the public contracts at issue involve a high amount, or the 
situation involves more than one agency or entity of the federal government.52  
 
According to the Clean Company Act, the CGU also has jurisdiction over 
administrative enforcement actions involving alleged bribery of foreign officials. 
In addition, for both domestic and foreign corruption cases, once an 
administrative proceeding is completed, the committee responsible for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Mark Pieth, Lucinda A. Low and Nicola Bannucci, “The OECD Convention on Bribery: A 
Commentary” (2nd ed., 2014).  The Czech Republic is a notable exception among civil law 
countries in that its Corporate Criminal Liability Act provides that “criminal liability of legal 
persons descends to all its legal successors,” including for cases involving corruption. OECD 
Working Group on Bribery, “Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD Convention on Bribery 
in the Czech Republic” (2013), online: <http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
cbribery/CzechRepublicphase3reportEN.pdf> at 17. 
51 Brazilian Decree No. 8,420, March 18, 2015.  
52 Ibid. at Art. 13. 
determining the liability of the legal entity must give notice to the Public 
Prosecutors’ Office (Ministério Público) which can then decide whether to 
proceed with civil charges (Art. 15).  The federal, state, and municipal 
governments also have the authority to file judicial actions in relation to alleged 
violations of the Act (Art. 19). 
 
By dispersing the authority to hold administrative proceedings across 
public entities in cases involving domestic officials, the Act creates the potential 
risk of uneven levels of enforcement as well as inconsistent rulings and standards. 
In addition, the entrustment of such proceedings to the highest authority within 
the public body involved in the alleged corruption may create troubling conflicts 
of interest. However, as discussed in more detail in Section 3, the concurrent 
jurisdictional authority exercised by the CGU alleviates some of these concerns as 
the functional institutional multiplicity it creates may facilitate compensation, 
collaboration and competition in administrative proceedings. Moreover, the 
ability of the Public Prosecutors’ Office and other government officials to bring 
civil charges provides an additional check on possible impunity. 
 
The Brazilian approach of allowing corruption-related cases to be brought 
and heard in multiple fora is not unique among other signatories to the OECD 
Convention. For example, in Colombia, legal persons can face administrative 
liability in independent proceedings by the central Superintendence of 
Corporations or within judicial criminal proceedings against natural persons, as 
well as civil liability for damages in the court system.53  Under the Administrative 
Offenses Act, which established corporate administrative liability in Germany, an 
administrative fine may be imposed against a legal person in cases where a 
criminal or administrative forum has found that member of the management has 
committed a corruption-related offense.54  
 
f) Penalties 
 
The potential administrative penalties for violations of the Clean Company Act 
include fines and publication of the administrative decision sanctioning the 
breaching company in a local or national newspaper, notices at the corporate 
headquarters, and on its website. The Act establishes that legal entities can be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 OECD Working Group, “Phase 1 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention 
in Colombia” (2012), online <http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/ColombiaPhase1ReportEn.pdf> at 11-13. 
54 OECD Working Group on Bribery, “Germany: Follow-Up to the Phase 3 Report & 
Recommendations” (2013), online: <http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/GermanyPhase3WrittenFollowUpEN.pdf> at 8. 
liable for fines between 0.1% to 20% of the company’s gross revenue (Art. 6), 
and the Decree specifies the minimum and maximum levels for such fines: 
 
• Minimum: the greater value among (i) the benefit sought or obtained by 
the company, (ii) 0.1% of the company’s gross revenue, and (iii) R$6,000 
(approximately US$2,300), if the company’s gross revenues cannot be 
determined. 
• Maximum: the lesser value between (i) 20% of the company’s gross 
revenue, and (ii) three times the value of the benefit sought or obtained by 
the company.55 
 
Beyond the administrative penalties, legal entities also face severe judicial 
penalties for violations of the Act, including disgorgement of the benefits sought 
or obtained by the illegal act; suspension or partial interruption of the company’s 
activities; exclusion from government funding and assistance (e.g., subsidies, 
grants, loans, donations) for one to five years; and, in extreme cases, dissolution 
of the legal entity (Art. 19). 
 
These corporate penalties are comparable to those provided under the 
bribery laws in other signatories to the OECD Convention. For example, under 
German law, legal persons face a maximum administrative fine of 10 million 
euros (US$11 million), 56  and, under the US FCPA, corporations and other 
business entities are subject to a criminal penalty of up to US$2 million per 
violation or twice the pecuniary gain sought in the corrupt transaction as well as a 
civil penalty of up to $16,000 per violation of the anti-bribery provisions.57 Like 
Brazil, other countries such as Australia, Greece, Hungary, and Korea all also 
allow fines to be calculated based on the advantage gained or intended to be 
gained through the corrupt act,58 while the UK Bribery Act sets no limits on 
potential fines for corporations. In addition, as under the Brazilian law, legal 
entities in many jurisdictions also face additional penalties such as confiscation of 
the proceeds of bribery or disgorgement of ill-gotten profits, 59  as well as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Using her line-item veto power, President Rousseff rejected a provision that would have limited 
the amount of the potential fine to the value of the contract or public tender related to the offense 
and would thus have provided minimal incentive for parties to refrain from engaging in bribery. 
56 OECD Working Group on Bribery (2013), supra note 54. 
57 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g)(1)(A)-(B), 78dd-3(e)(1)(A)-(B), 78ff(c)(1)(A)-(B); 18 U.S.C. § 
3571(d). 
58 OECD and The World Bank, “Identification and Quantification of the Proceeds of Bribery” 
(2012), online: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264174801-en> at 20. 
59 Ibid. 
collateral consequences such as the potential suspension or debarment from public 
contracting or assistance.60 
 
When determining penalties, the Clean Company Act states that 
authorities can consider the seriousness of the offense, the advantage gained or 
intended by the offender, whether the offense was fully completed, the degree of 
damage or risk of damage, the effects of the offense, the company’s economic 
strength of the company, its cooperation with investigating authorities, and the 
existence of internal compliance controls (Art. 6(6)).  The 2015 Decree that 
complements the Act61 uses these general criteria to lay out a comprehensive 
scheme for authorities to calculate the amount of any fine based on a series of 
aggravating and mitigating factors (Arts. 17 to 19); it further establishes that the 
specific factors that can be applied to a given case must be determined during the 
administrative proceeding (Art. 20). 
 
The Clean Company Act also allows authorities to conclude “leniency 
agreements” with companies accused of misconduct as a means to mitigate 
potential sanctions. Under the Act and the Decree, entry into a leniency agreement 
requires a company to cooperate and collaborate “effectively” with the 
investigation and any administrative proceeding, including identifying the 
involved parties and expeditiously providing information, documents, and other 
evidence substantiating the misconduct to the government. The Act and Decree 
further specify that the CGU may execute leniency agreements relating to 
violations at the federal level or involving foreign governments. Performance 
under the terms of a leniency agreement may have one or more of the following 
benefits for a firm: (i) exemption from publication of the administrative decision 
sanctioning its misconduct; (ii) exemption from the prohibition on receiving 
public funding and assistance; (iii) reduction of the fine imposed by up to two-
thirds; or (iv) exemption from, or mitigation of, administrative sanctions set out in 
certain statutes governing public tenders and government contracts. 
 
Most countries join Brazil in allowing officials to take aggravating and 
mitigating factors, including a company’s willingness to cooperate with 
enforcement authorities, into consideration when determining the level of fines or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 While debarment is discretionary in countries like the United States and Australia, conviction 
under the Canadian Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act (CFPOA) results in mandatory 
debarment.  Public Works and Government Services Canada, “Integrity Regime: Ineligibility and 
Suspension Policy” (July 3, 2015), online: <http://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/ci-if/politique-policy-
eng.html> Part C §§3(e), 5(e).  See also Stuart H. Deming, Anti-Bribery Laws in Common Law 
Jurisdictions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
61 Brazilian Decree No. 8,420, March 18, 2015. 
other sanctions to be imposed in corruption cases.62 In addition, jurisdictions such 
as the UK and US allow prosecutors to reach negotiated resolutions with legal and 
natural persons accused of misconduct that serve a purpose similar to that of 
Brazil’s leniency agreements. Deferred-prosecution agreements (DPAs) and non-
prosecution agreements (NPAs) generally require the defendant to agree to pay a 
monetary penalty, cooperate with authorities, admit the relevant facts, and take 
specified compliance and remediation measures; in exchange, the government 
agrees to delay or withdraw criminal charges.63    
 
 
2. Using Institutional Multiplicity to Fight Corruption in Brazil  
 
While ex-ante mechanisms are intended to prevent or deter actors from engaging 
in corruption before it takes place, a system of accountability operates ex-post, i.e. 
only after the corrupt act has occurred. An effective system of accountability 
requires a “web” of effective institutions that will increase the likelihood that 
those who engage in corrupt activities will be caught and punished.64 In this 
regard, there are three primary functions that these institutions should perform: (i) 
oversight, which entails monitoring those occupying positions of power and/or 
engaged in activities where there is high risk of corruption in order to identify 
quickly anything suspicious or atypical; (ii) investigation, which is the process of 
obtaining more detailed information about acts or activities once suspicion has 
been raised; and (iii) punishment, which is the effective application of sanctions 
in those cases in which there is sufficient evidence to prove misconduct.65 
 
Brazil possesses an extensive stock of anti-corruption legislation.66 It also boasts a 
wealth of accountability institutions charged with monitoring, investigating and 	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Commission, supra note 34, at 52-53; Transcript of Proceedings Taken in the Court of Queen’s 
Bench of Alberta, Judicial Centre of Calgary, “Her Majesty the Queen v. Griffiths Energy 
International, E-File No.:CCQ13GRIFFITHSENER,” (January 25, 2013) Action No. 
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63 See, e.g., Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice and the Enforcement Division of 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 34; Crime and Courts Act 2013, 
Schedule 17, online: <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/22/schedule/17/enacted>.  
64 Pope supra note 10; Scott Mainwaring and Christoper Welna (Eds.), Democratic accountability 
in Latin America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
65 Matthew M. Taylor and Vinícius C. Buranelli, “Ending Up in Pizza: Accountability as a 
Problem of Institutional Arrangement in Brazil” (2007), Latin American Politics and Society, 
49(1), at 59-87; Power and Taylor, supra note 3. 
66 Stocker, supra note at 12; Carson and Prado, supra note 13. 
sanctioning those involved in corruption. The numerous investigations that have 
uncovered corruption schemes at different levels of the government over the past 
decade provide evidence of the strong performance of the country’s systems of 
oversight and investigation. There has also been progress in the system of 
administrative sanctions, although, as discussed in detail below, the judiciary 
remains a core weakness in Brazil’s accountability system. 67  We have 
hypothesized that such progress can be partially explained by the duplication of 
oversight, investigative, and punishment functions among various governmental 
entities, which we label “institutional multiplicity.” 68 Largely relying on previous 
work that has been done on this concept, this section explores the instances of 
institutional multiplicity in Brazil’s systems of corruption oversight (National 
Court of Accounts and Office of the Comptroller General), investigation (Public 
Ministry, Federal Police Department, and the Comptroller General), and 
punishment (the Comptroller General, the National Audit Court, and the Brazilian 
judiciary).  
 
The Brazilian experience suggests that functional institutional overlaps 
allow for compensation, collaboration and competition among various 
governmental entities and seem to have played a role in bolstering anti-corruption 
efforts in Brazil. Thus, the country’s experience suggests that institutional 
multiplicity may provide advantages in combatting a complex governance 
challenge like corruption, especially in a context where there are flaws or other 
sources of inefficiency or ineffectiveness in the accountability system as a whole. 
 
2.1 What is Institutional Multiplicity? 
 
The concept of institutional multiplicity has been used by different scholars to 
refer to different phenomena. For instance, a significant portion of the political 
science literature has used the concept in connection with analyses of the 
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democracy in Brazil.” In: Charles H. Blake and Stephen D. Morris (Eds.), Corruption and 
Democracy in Latin America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009) at 150-68.   
68 For an analysis of the recent progress, see Bruno W. Speck, “Auditing institutions.” In: Timothy 
J. Power and Matthew M. Taylor (Eds.), Corruption and democracy in Brazil: the struggle for 
accountability (Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 2011) chapter 6; Arantes, supra 
note 1. For an analysis of the concept of institutional multiplicity in the context of anti-corruption 
legislation, see Prado and Carson, supra note 14. 
mechanisms, patterns, and processes of institutional change and stability.69 Many 
sociologists, in contrast, have relied on the concept to analyze heterogeneity in 
models of action, especially those in processes that culminate in the loss of social 
order or growth of social entropy.70 While the former aims to explain change in 
formal rules and in organizations, the latter focuses on explaining behavioural and 
social change. The concept of institutional multiplicity used in this article is closer 
to the latter, for two reasons.  
 
First, economists and political scientists have often adopted the widely 
popular definition of institutions provided by Douglass North: “Institutions are the 
rules of the game of a society, or, more formally, the humanly devised constraints 
that structure human interactions. They are composed of formal rules (statute law, 
common law, regulation), informal constraints (conventions, norms of behaviour, 
and self-imposed codes of conduct), and the enforcement characteristics of 
both.”71 However, as Michael Trebilcock and Mariana Mota Prado have argued, 
this definition of institutions generally strikes lawyers and legal scholars as odd 
and overly broad:  
 
“the legally prescribed speed limit on a given highway is not 
considered to be an institution but rather a legal rule promulgated 
by one set of institutions, enforced by another, and in the event of 
disputes, adjudicated by yet another. Moreover, by including 
informal constraints (cultural conventions, norms of behaviour, 
and self-imposed codes of conduct) in this definition of 
institutions, the concept of institutions becomes so all-
encompassing that it includes almost any conceivable factor that 
may influence human behaviour and hence risks losing any 
operational content.” 72  
 
A definition of institutions that may be more attractive to lawyers is “those 
organizations (formal and informal) that are charged or entrusted by a society 	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the United States and Japan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004). James Mahoney and 
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York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelan (Eds.) Beyond 
Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005).   
70 Elizabeth S. Clemens and James M. Cook, “Politics and Institutionalism: Explaining Durability 
and Change” (1999), 25 Annual Review of Sociology 441. 
71 Douglass North, “The new institutional economics and Third World development.” In J. Harris 
et al. (Eds), Economics and Third Word Development (London: Routledge, 1995). 
72 Michael Trebilcock and Mariana Mota Prado, Advanced Introduction to Law and Development 
(Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing), Chapter 3. 
with making, administering, enforcing, or adjudicating its laws or policies”.73 This 
is the definition adopted by organizational and economic sociologists and 
endorsed in this article.74  
 
Second, this article explores the possibility that the existence of more than 
one institutional option may change individuals’ choices and behaviours. Thus, 
rather than explaining why there have been such significant institutional and legal 
reforms in the Brazilian anti-corruption system in recent years (such as the 
creation of the Office of the Comptroller General and the strengthening of the 
Federal Police),75 our analysis focuses on the potential for behavioural change in 
environments in which institutional and legal changes have already taken place. In 
this regard, our conception of institutional multiplicity is closer to the one often 
adopted by sociologists. As Clemens and Cook explain, a lack of institutional 
alternatives can generate regularities of social action, which are then taken for 
granted.76 In the Brazilian case, such established patterns include the expectation 
that efforts against corruption will not succeed and that individuals and 
companies, especially those in positions of power, will continue to engage in 
corrupt activities with impunity. In this context, the creation or existence of 
alternative institutional paths to hold corrupt actors accountable can generate 
contradictions that destabilize these existing regularities of action. 77  More 
specifically, institutional multiplicity has the potential to generate an external 
contradiction, i.e. the behavioural regularities observed in one institution are 
challenged by contradictory behavioural patterns followed by another institution.  
 
For example, individuals in one accountability institution with a history of 
inaction or ineffectiveness may be unable to change their behaviour in that 
context, but a new institution may not set up the constraints that existed in the old 
one, creating space for effective accountability by setting up under different 
incentives and operating under a different culture. And the change can be even 
more drastic: once those in the old and inefficient institution starts to observe their 
counterparts in another institution proactively investigating or prosecuting 	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corruption, they may begin to question their negative assumptions about their own 
institution’s potential role in combatting corruption. 
 
However, while the concept of institutional multiplicity used in this article 
is closer to the one often adopted in the sociological literature, it does not fully 
overlap with it; specifically, we look beyond those factors identified in the 
sociological literature to embrace a wide array of potential causal explanations as 
to how institutional multiplicity can generate change. As discussed by Clemens 
and Cook, there are two potential mechanisms that can effect change in 
behavioural patterns: socialization and institutional incentives. Both have 
significant power in explaining observed changes, as illustrated by the following 
analogy: “if a mouse repeatedly takes the same path across a table, this regular 
path may be due to either to the presence of a maze that obstructs many possible 
changes in direction or to effective socialization through behaviour modification. 
However, since the mouse may be well socialized and in a maze, these 
‘institutionalisms’ are properly understood as complements, rather than mutually 
exclusive explanations.”78 Thus, while the focus of our analysis is on the creation 
of formal institutions that offer alternative paths and how this new “maze” may be 
modifying behaviour, we do not dismiss the possibility that the causal mechanism 
that may be allowing for changes to take place in such alternative institutional 
pathways also include informal mechanisms, such as socializing actors in a 
different institutional culture.   
 
While the causal mechanisms that explain behavioural change may be 
quite distinct for economists, political scientists, and sociologists, these 
disciplines share a generally consistent approach to explaining why there is lack 
of change in many circumstances. As described by path dependence theory,79 
once an institution has been established, various feedback effects and self-
reinforcing mechanisms make it increasingly more costly and difficult to enact 
serious reform (or eliminate it entirely), even when its performance is sub-
optimal. Institutions and institutional arrangements often foster increasing returns, 
such that the benefits of maintaining the status quo – and the relative costs 
associated with pursuing alternatives – grow over time as more and more people 
become invested in the existing framework. Cognizant of these obstacles to 
change, so-called historical institutionalists frequently characterize institutional 	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evolution as a process “characterized by relatively long periods of path-dependent 
institutional stability and reproduction that are punctuated occasionally by brief 
phases of institutional flux – referred to as critical junctures – during which more 
dramatic change is possible.”80 However, the literature on institutional change has 
increasingly challenged this dualist view of institutional development as a contrast 
between periods of stability and significant change to emphasize that institutional 
transformation is often incremental.81   
 
The idea that institutional and behavioural change is associated with 
multiple institutional pathways is captured by a number of different concepts in 
the literature. So-called institutional “layering”82 describes a process of gradual 
institutional change that occurs as the result of introducing new rules or creating 
new organizations without eliminating existing ones. Closely related to the 
concept of institutional layering and partially overlapping with it is the concept of 
institutional bypass.83 An institutional bypass has three characteristics: (1) it keeps 
the traditional institution in place; (2) it creates an alternative pathway through 
which to deliver government services or discharge governmental functions (which 
becomes an option to those using the services); and (3) it tries to be more efficient 
or functionally effective than the traditional institution.84 Bypasses are a specific 
type of layering. For example, while layering includes the introduction of new 
rules that fundamentally change the way existing institutions work,85 institutional 
bypass is limited to situations in which newly-established institutions operate 
independently and in parallel to pre-existing institutions, while performing 
essentially the same functions. 86  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Giovanni Capoccia and R. Daniel Kelemen, “The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, 
Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism” (2007), 59(3) World Politics 341-69, 
at 341. 
81 See, e.g., James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, “A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change.” In 
Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power, supra note 69, at 1-37; Eric 
Schickler, Disjointed, Pluralism:  Institutional Innovation and the Development of the U.S.. 
Congress (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), at 252-54; Wolfgang Streeck and 
Kathleen Thelen, “Introduction:  Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies.” In 
Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies, supra note 69, at 1-39. 
82 Thelen (2004), supra note 69. 
83 Graham D. Willis and Mariana M. Prado, “Process and Pattern in Institutional Reforms: The 
Police Pacifying Units in Brazil as an Institutional Bypass” (2014), World Development, Vol. 64, 
at 235. 
84 Mariana M. Prado, “Institutional Bypass: An Alternative for Development Reform” (2011), 
online: SSRN <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1815442>. 
85 Schickler, supra note 81 at 16 (describing how the superimposition of new budget committees 
on a decades-old structure of authorization, appropriations, and revenue committees in the U.S. 
Congress altered the process of developing fiscal policy). 
86 For the distinction between institutional bypass and institutional layering, see Willis and Prado 
(2014). See also, Thelen (2004), supra note 69 (detailing how establishment of an alternate 
 
While institutional multiplicity is not necessarily the same as layering or 
bypass, it does share with both these concepts some important characteristics. The 
idea of institutional multiplicity is broad enough to embrace the cases of layering 
in which the changes happen through the creation of a new institution as well as 
cases of bypasses. However, not all cases of institutional multiplicity can be 
described as layering or bypass. Layering, on the one hand, comprises “a partial 
renegotiation of elements of a given set of institutions while leaving others in 
place.”87 An example of layering in the Brazilian context is the creation of special 
“judicial bancs” (varas especializadas) to evaluate money-laundering cases. The 
initiative was implemented as an option for federal tribunals in 2003,88 and, after 
showing significant results, these specialized judicial bancs became mandatory for 
federal appeals tribunals in 2013.89 This is a case of layering because it adds a 
new element into the system, but prosecutors still cannot choose in which forum 
their cases will be heard. An example of bypass, on the other hand, can be found 
in Indonesia where prosecutors have the option of bringing corruption-related 
cases in conventional courts or in specialized anti-corruption courts that operate in 
parallel.90 These courts offer a bypass because they create a choice of forum for 
prosecutors. In the context of accountability systems more broadly, institutional 
multiplicity embraces any diversification of functions, such as the common 
existence of multiple forms and layers of punishment options that reinforce each 
other. For example, in cases involving political corruption, offenders may face a 
series of overlapping penalties, including electoral sanctions from the public at the 
ballot box, political sanctions such as censure or administrative removal from 
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office, and negative coverage in the media coverage, as well as formal legal 
sanctions, such as criminal or civil judgments.91  
 
Returning to the specific example of Brazil’s Clean Company Act, the 
creation of accountability processes that can culminate in administrative sanctions 
for legal entities which have engaged in corruption is therefore a case of 
multiplicity, rather than layering or bypass. As in cases involving layering and 
bypasses, the establishment of administrative process and sanctions do not affect 
the existing sanctioning institution – the judiciary. However, unlike layering and 
bypass, the new administrative system runs parallel to the judicial system but does 
not perform exactly the same functions. Similarly to electoral or political 
sanctions, the administrative sanction is complementary to and independent of the 
judicial sanction. Moreover, it is subordinated to judicial scrutiny. Thus, unlike 
the examples of layering and bypass, the new administrative system does not 
provide a functional equivalent to the existing judicial system of punishment; 
however, as we argue below, this new approach to sanctioning corrupt entities has 
the potential to overcome obstacles in the existing accountability system.  
 
Despite the differences among the concepts of institutional multiplicity, 
layering, and bypass, all three arrangements have particular advantages in 
overcoming entrenched barriers to institutional change.  The establishment of an 
alternative communicates to parties both within and outside that pre-existing 
institution that the status quo is not inevitable or necessarily interminable.92 It thus 
introduces the possibility of a new institutional framework that may lead to 
stronger performance and outcomes. Moreover, outright and abrupt institutional 
displacement – the supplantation of one institution by a new one – may generate 
intense opposition from constituencies invested in (or who benefit under) the 
current framework. Institutional layering, bypass, and multiplicity can create 
displacement over time and in the long term, but in the short term they leave 
intact existing institutions and merely provide alternative paths for achieving the 
same or similar objectives.93 For this reason, these three arrangements may ignite 
less direct antagonism.94  Finally, the presence of multiple institutional referents 
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“enlarges the toolbox from which reformers can draw in crafting new solutions, 
facilitating deeper change.”95  
 	   Broadly, institutional multiplicity can combat corruption by limiting 
opportunities for corruption (proactive institutional multiplicity) or by increasing 
the likelihood of catching and sanctioning corrupt behavior (reactive institutional 
multiplicity). Examples of proactive institutional multiplicity to reduce 
opportunities for corruption include the elimination of monopolies in the 
provision of services. For example, Susan Rose-Ackerman has argued that, rather 
than entrusting a single official with the power and discretion to issue a given 
license or provide another service, multiple officials should be granted such 
authority so that a private party who is solicited for a bribe by one agent can 
simply turn to another to secure the service honestly. 96  While intuitively 
compelling, this strategy is subject to several drawbacks and qualifications. First, 
there is a risk of unintended consequences: while competing jurisdictions may 
decrease bribes, it can increase the amount of total theft from the government.97 
Second, institutional competition can also create more opportunities for 
corruption: if I want to obtain a license that I do not qualify to obtain, having two 
officials to approach with a bribe, rather than one, may increase the chances that I 
will be successful. Third, the implementation of an effective system of 
institutional multiplicity depends on the possibility of establishing competing 
jurisdictions, which may not be possible due to limited resources or the type of 
service delivered. Fourth, it requires the creation and cultivation of an institutional 
structure in which competition creates incentives to improve performance; if 
institutional multiplicity merely facilitates shirking by one or more employees or 
agencies, it will be ineffective in helping to curtail corruption and may simply 
waste resources.98  
 
Institutional multiplicity as a reactive tool for combatting corruption, in 
turn, involves generating alternative avenues through which authorities may 
monitor, investigate, and punish corruption. When it is possible for multiple 
institutions to independently monitor, investigate and pursue administrative, civil, 	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and criminal charges based on suspicions or detected irregularities, the likelihood 
that those engaged in corruption will be held accountable will rise. The 
assumption is that institutional overlap can enhance the overall effectiveness of 
the “web” of accountability institutions by avoiding self-reinforcing mechanisms 
or corrupt institutional cultures and fostering institutional competition.99  
 
Institutional multiplicity as a reactive tool has a number of potential 
benefits. First, it arguably fosters competition to improve institutional 
efficiency.100 This idea is present in the broader rule of law literature; for 
example, Thomas Heller has recommended institutional multiplicity as a strategy 
to overcome obstacles to rule of law reforms in developing countries.101 Effective 
change in established organizations, Heller argues, can only come about when 
organizations are motivated by incentives that come with competition; where 
multiple legal organizations have non-exclusive jurisdiction, the ability of the 
incumbent institution to resist change is reduced. Applied to the issue of 
corruption, competition can create pressure for organizations to address those 
obstacles that hamper their ability to combat corrupt activity effectively. Second, 
institutional overlap can serve a gap-filling function in instances when institutions 
fail to perform their duties in regard to investigating and punishing corrupt 
activity.102 Corruption is a complex, secretive activity and therefore presents 
unique challenges to investigative officials. As such, functional overlap may be 
the best mechanism to ensure that corruption, whether entrenched or 
opportunistic, is ultimately exposed. Institutional multiplicity could reduce the 
risk of failures in each step of the corruption accountability process. Third, 
institutional multiplicity could result in collaboration and complementarity.103 In 
this situation there is, first, a benefit to enforcement to the extent that institutional 
multiplicity corresponds to more available human, financial, and other resources. 
Moreover, cooperation between institutions could result in specialization, where 
different institutions contribute different skills to perform a particular task, and 
these different sets of skills complement each other, improving overall 
effectiveness in tackling corruption. These advantages suggest that institutional 
multiplicity may, in some instances, be an effective strategy for combatting 
corruption.  
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While reactive institutional multiplicity can offer benefits, it also has a 
number of potential drawbacks. First, because institutional overlap implies 
duplication it can sometimes be an inefficient allocation of resources, especially 
in the short term, and this concern is particularly relevant in low-income 
developing countries with scarce fiscal resources that struggle to provide adequate 
coverage for other societal needs, such as education and health. Second, in some 
contexts institutional multiplicity may engender destructive competition and 
encourage individuals in one institution to act in a manner that undermines the 
efforts of their counterparts in another institution. Third, insofar as institutional 
multiplicity increases the number of officials with the power to investigate and 
punish corruption, there may be an increased incidence of corruption in the 
processes of holding individuals accountable for corruption. For example, 
institutional multiplicity may increase the number authorities from multiple 
(corrupt) investigation institutions who are able to extract bribes by threatening 
innocent citizens with false charges. We acknowledge these limitations, which 
should be considered in a careful cost-benefit analysis on a case-by-case basis, 
taking into consideration the resources, capacities, and policy needs within 
individual countries or societies. As such, a strategy of institutional multiplicity 
should be undertaken only after careful consideration of the potential benefits and 
drawbacks, based on the specific context.  
 
2.2 Institutional Multiplicity in Brazil 
 
Since 2005, there has been a generally a considerable number of high-profile and 
widely publicized corruption-related “operations,” which typically involve the 
execution of  arrest or search and seizure warrants as well as the participation by 
the Public Prosecutors’ Office (Ministério Público) or other bodies such as the 
Revenue Service, the Social Security Ministry, the state police, or regulatory 
agencies.104  In addition to these criminal and civil investigations, there have also 
been a number of administrative investigations, including those related to the 
various audits regularly conducted by the CGU.105 This heightened activity by 	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Brazilian authorities in the realm of corruption over the past ten years has been 
particularly notable given its contrast to the previous weakness and paucity of 
anti-corruption initiatives in the country. What could explain what has been 
perceived as significant changes in the system, and what lessons can be learned 
from them?  
 
While increases in the number of cases could be interpreted as evidence 
suggesting that bureaucratic waste and corruption spiked dramatically over that 
period, the specialized literature has suggested that the escalations may more 
appropriately reflect changes in the anti-corruption institutions capacity, 
resources, policies, or procedures. 106 Similarly, the higher number of 
investigations by the Public Prosecutors’ Office may reveal “more on the traits of 
how the criminal code is applied than on the crime in question.”107 Neverthless, 
Prado and Carson argue that institutional multiplicity may explain, at least 
partially, why the Brazilian federal government’s accountability system has 
demonstrated strong vitality, especially in monitoring and investigating 
corruption.108  
 
2.2.1 Institutional Multiplicity in Oversight 
 
At the federal level, there is a multitude of institutions performing constant 
monitoring of the government in Brazil, but our analysis focuses on  two core 
oversight institutions: National Court of Accounts (Tribunal de Contas da União, 
TCU) and Office of Comptroller General of the Union (Controladoria-Geral da 
União , CGU). 
 
The external oversight body for the legislative and executive branches, the 
TCU possesses institutional guarantees of autonomy akin to an independent 
central bank or an independent regulatory agency. As part of its oversight and 
monitoring activities, the TCU assists Congress in the preparation and execution 
of the federal budget, inspects annual financial reports from all offices of the 
public administration, and approves the hiring, retirement, and pension policies 
for all civil servants (Federal Constitution art. 71, I, II and III). Each year the 
TCU’s staff of 2,400 people inspects roughly 3,000 annual financial reports from 
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various government offices and processes several thousands of cases involving 
the employment and retirement of civil servants.109 
 
CGU is part of the executive branch. Despite being responsible for internal 
accountability within the executive branch, CGU can be considered an instrument 
of horizontal accountability.110 Notable among its functions is its program to audit 
the use and management of federal transfers by municipalities. Brazil has over 
5,000 municipalities and the CGU does not have resources to audit all of them. 
Thus, it uses a lottery to randomly select those of up to 500,000 inhabitants that 
will be audited, around a total of 60 municipalities in average twice per year.111 
This is known as the Random Audits Program (Programa de Fiscalização a 
partir de Sorteios Públicos).112 There have been studies indicating that such audits 
have been effective in reducing corruption at the local level, especially in 
education and health, and the likelihood that corrupt mayors are reelected.113 
Another important initiative is the Observatory of Public Expenses (Observatório 
de Despesa Pública), 114  which develops technology to constantly evaluate 
patterns in public expenditures at the federal level. The initiative has received 
multiple international awards, including the United Nations Public Service Award 
in 2011.115 The CGU´s Directorate of Strategic Information also conducts a less 
publicly visible monitoring program which involves cross-checking data in 
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publicly available databases, in search for evidence of misuse of misappropriation 
of federal government funds.116 
 
The institutional multiplicity created by the coexistence of these two 
separate monitoring authorities appears to have helped to redress some of the 
internal weaknesses in each organization – especially the TCU – and improve 
overall oversight in the country.   
 
Despite being formally touted as an archetypical auditing institution,117 
three characteristics of the TCU undermine its efficacy in fighting corruption. 
First, TCU officials spend most of their time on routine monitoring tasks such as 
the preparation of the audit statement of the government’s annual accounts, 
review of annual financial reports from all units of government managing public 
funds, and approval of policies related to civil servants’ employment and 
retirement, rather than detecting irregularities or analyzing systematically areas in 
which there is greater risk of corruption.118 Second, the TCU’s governance 
structure is perceived to be dysfunctional. Despite being independent from 
Congress, and relying on a cadre of highly qualified and professional civil 
servants, the top echelon of politically-appointed and organizationally-powerful 
ministers has strong incentives to block politically sensitive issues and topics.119 
Thus, as illustrated by the labour court case (TRT case) described below, the TCU 
is vulnerable to political capture.120 Third, the liberal accessibility of judicial 
appeals limits the ability of the TCU to punish effectively those involved in 
wrongdoing. While, as described below, the TCU may impose administrative and 
civil penalties, regular courts often strike down such sanctions or take so long to 
decide on these cases that they end up being closed due to the statute of 
limitations.121 
 
The municipal ambulance kickback scheme eventually uncovered through 
“Operation Bloodsucker” provides an illustrative example of how institutional 	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multiplicity has proven an effective strategy at addressing some of these core 
challenges within the TCU. The TCU’s formalistic and ossified auditing 
processes initially failed to detect the scheme, which involved kickbacks to 
members of Congress for the sale of overpriced ambulances and other medical 
equipment to municipal governments. However, as part of the aforementioned 
program of random municipal audits, 122  in 2004 the CGU came across 
irregularities in the public procurement processes used in some municipalities to 
purchase ambulances for the public health care system; specifically they 
discovered  that many municipalities had purchased non-operational or used 
vehicles despite the fact that the government had paid for new ones, and that 
many cities that had initiated procurement processes to acquire more vehicles had 
recently bought ambulances that were not in use. 123  Upon finding these 
irregularities, the CGU sent a document to the Minister of Health indicating that 
there was a group manipulating procurement processes at the local level across 
the country and embezzling public funds through the sale of overpriced 
ambulances to municipalities. The CGU asked the Minister to take the necessary 
measures to address the failures in procurement processes, while at the same time 
alerting the Federal Police about the case. In 2006, the federal police unveiled that 
a total of 1,000 ambulances had been purchased in this scheme, involving a total 
of US$55 million. In the same year, Congress started its own internal 
investigation through a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry (Comissão 
Parlamentar de Inquérito, CPI). The CPI recommended that 72 congressional 
representatives be removed from office for being involved in the scheme, but 
none were expelled or faced any other penalty.124 The lack of sanctioning is a 
problem that we address below.  
 
The CGU’s ability to catch an irregularity that had not been detected by 
the TCU is partially due to the fact that CGU analyzes the effectiveness of 
government programs, not only the formalities associated with 
expenditures. 125 The bloodsucker scandal may thus be an example of 
compensation or complementarity. Some may argue that the TCU’s failure to 
detect the scheme reflects deficiencies in its auditing process, while the CGU’s 
success in identifying the irregularities indicates that their auditing methods are 	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more effective. If so, this would be a case of compensation. On the other hand, 
one may claim that this is simply a result of two distinct – but sound – auditing 
methods. The monitoring techniques of the CGU were specifically designed with 
different parameters than those used by the TCU in order to increase the 
likelihood that each institution could catch things undetected by the other.126 The 
CGU auditors’ detection of irregularities that were not captured by the TCU’s 
analysis would thus provide an example of complementarity. Regardless of 
whether the “bloodsucker” incident is interpreted as a case of compensation or 
complementarity, the corrupt scheme was uncovered by authorities and thus 
illustrates how overlapping oversight functions may increase the chances that 
wrongdoing will be detected.  
 
Institutional multiplicity has also been effective in overcoming the second 
problem of TCU, which Melo describes as “a lack of connection between the 
professional work produced by [the TCU’s] cadre of auditors and the political 
logic that underlies decision-making at its top decision-making body”.127 There is 
some dispute as to how much this affects the functioning of TCU.128 Figueiredo 
claims that such impact is high: “the recommendations contained in the reports 
prepared by the TCU’s technical personnel are usually not followed by its board 
of ministers for political reasons”.129 Based on that, another political scientist 
concludes that, “[the TCU’s] effectiveness depends primarily on the extent to 
which other actors – such as the media or opposition legislators – can publicize its 
audits”.130 In this case, there is compensation, as other institutions are stepping in 
to compensate for the failures of the original institution.  
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A good example of the importance of institutional multiplicity in 
providing an alternative channel for the technical cadre of auditors to seek further 
investigation of suspicious activity is the case of corruption scandal involving the 
labour court in the state of São Paulo (also known as the TRT case). As Power 
and Taylor describe, “the cost of building the Regional Labor Court in São Paulo 
during the 1990s was inflated nearly fourfold, with proceeds on the order of 
US$100 million allegedly appropriated by Judge Nicolau dos Santos Neto 
(commonly refered to as ‘Lalau’), with the participation of a senator, Luiz 
Estevão, and the president and vice president of the construction company that 
won the building contract.”131 The scandal came to the fore in 1998, but the 
auditors of the TCU had called attention to numerous irregularities back in 1992, 
when the building was simply a project.  
 
An analysis of the paperwork revealed so many irregularities that the 1992 
auditing report suggested cancelling the contract with the construction company, 
withholding any future transfers from Congress to the project, ordering the return 
of all money already transferred to the federal government, and conducting a 
thorough investigation of the project. In 1993, that report reached the highest 
echelon of the TCU, but the minister initially assigned to the case kept the case 
moving at glacial place, allowing the construction (and the corruption scheme) to 
move forward. In 1995, the minister initially assigned to the case retired, and the 
new minister in charge took an entire year to evaluate it. In 1996, the TCU issued 
a decision: there were indeed irregularities, but since the construction had already 
started, and a lot of money had already been spent, the minister argued that 
interrupting project at this point would be costlier (due to the waste) than allowing 
it to be concluded. It is estimated that those involved in the scheme embezzled 
around US$35,000/day during this period, which included kickbacks to senators 
who approved the transfer of federal funds to the construction project.132  
 
The TCU’s failure in monitoring this project was finally remedied by a 
member of Congress, the Public Prosecutor’s office, and the media.133 In 1996, 	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Senator Giovanni Queiroz blocked a special transfer to the TRT project 
(amounting to US$5.5 million) during a regular congressional session, only to 
find out that the same transfer was eventually approved in December, when 
Congress was in recess and only a few representatives remained at work to deal 
with urgent matters. Senator Queiroz approached the Public Prosecutors’ Office 
to suggest an investigation of the project. After assessing that the lifestyle of 
Lalau, which included a US$1 million apartment in Miami, luxury cars, and 
lavish parties in expensive restaurants, was incompatible with his means, the 
Public Prosecutors’ Office started an investigation and, in 1997, uncovered the 
connections between all the parties involved and the money transfers that 
siphoned public resources to private accounts.134  
 
By 1998, the Public Prosecutors’ Office had collected enough evidence to 
request that the judiciary sequester the assets of Lalau and all others involved in 
the scheme. After that, the scheme became public news and was covered heavily 
by the media. Under public pressure, the judiciary ordered the removal of Lalau 
from his position as chief justice of the labor tribunal in September of that year 
and forced the TCU to conduct a new audit of the project. This time, the TCU was 
able to determine quickly that there were irregularities and to decide that the 
construction should be suspended. It was only then that Congress suspended 
transfers of federal funds to the project, as recommended back in 1992. In 1999, 
in the aftermath of the scandal, in a move guided by electoral reasons, Congress 
set up a CPI to assess corruption in the judiciary in general, but gave special 
attention to the labor law court. It was then revealed that Lalau alone had 
embezzled more than US$50 million in the scheme.135  
 
In sum, this example illustrates that the existence of alternative 
mechanisms of oversight and monitoring, especially if the institutions with 
overlapping jurisdiction have different governance structures and therefore 
different systems of incentives, may address the shortcomings of the existing 
auditing institutions. In this case, the TCU failed to act, but the error was “fixed” 
by a member of Congress, the Public Prosecutors’ office, and the media.  	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Finally, over the years since the creation of the CGU, the TCU has 
increased its activity. The MESICIC Committee notes that the total number of 
processes (including audits, inspections, consultations, complaints, etc.) 
conducted by the TCU rose from 6,135 in 2006 to 8,019 in 2010.136 While no 
causal connection between these two events can be empirically tested or proven, 
they suggest that institutional multiplicity and the mechanisms through which it 
may impact the operation of accountability institutions is something that deserves 
further investigation.  
 
2.2.2 Institutional Multiplicity in Investigation 
 
The core investigative institutions in Brazil are the Federal Public Prosecutors’ 
Office (Ministério Público Federal, MPF) and the Federal Police (Departamento 
da Polícia Federal, DFP). The MPF typically conducts investigations into 
criminal matters in conjunction with the DFP. Indeed, the rise in the number of 
DFP investigations over the last 5 to 10 years137 appears to be the result not only 
of an increase in resources for the police but also increased cooperation between 
the DFP and MPF and other investigative bodies such as state public prosecutors, 
Revenue Service Inspectors, and government ministries.138 In many cases, joint 
task forces have been formed in order to better coordinate investigations. The 
results appear positive,139 providing strong evidence that institutional multiplicity 
has led to productive collaboration. 
 
While the MPF and DPF collaborate frequently on high profile cases and 
operations,140 the same is not true for day-to-day investigations. In these cases, 
even quick consultations between the DPF and the MPF are rare. In cases 
involving “serious” violations, the MPF consults with the DPF once a month, and 
all communication is via paper memorandums. This frequency of communication 
is fairly low compared to other countries such as the United States and can hardly 
be classified as cooperation. While the MPF may request additional information 
from the DPF, such petitions must be done via publicly-available memorandums, 
reducing the speed and efficacy of the investigative process. If the DPF does not 
comply with the MPF’s request, the MPF may step in and conduct that 
investigation on its own, but such inquiries are rare. In addition, the 	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constitutionality of such investigations into potential criminal matters remains 
unresolved. A case involving the issue has been pending before the Brazilian 
Supreme Court (STF) since 2008,141 and, in the absence of a firm resolution 
regarding the legal status of such independent investigations, the STF has made 
clear those cases raise suspicions and may be invalidated. In addition to this 
constitutional ambiguity, the exercise of such powers faces political opposition; a 
bill proposing to eliminate MPF’s investigative authority was introduced but 
voted down by the Brazilian Congress in 2013. 142  Given these legal and 
legislative developments, public prosecutors are very careful and selective about 
the cases in which they proceed alone.143 
 
Despite being the exception rather than the rule, in a few cases the 
investigative powers of MPF have compensated for the lack of police action. 
Cases in which MPF played a prominent role include the recent mensalão case. 
Indeed, according to the Attorney General (Procurador Geral da República), it 
would not have been possible to prosecute and convict those involved in the 
mensalão case without the investigation conducted by the MPF.144 However, 
given the current legal and political climate, it remains uncertain whether the 
MPF will retain these powers moving forward. If they are curtailed or, 
alternatively, confirmed or enhanced, it will be an opportunity to test the 
hypothesis advanced in this paper. Such a change could allow assessment of the 
impact that institutional multiplicity may have on the overall level and success of 
criminal investigations in Brazil.  
 
While there is multiplicity in criminal investigations, the DPF has no 
jurisdiction over civil investigations. In actions concerning administrative 
improbity, the MPF is the only institution that can officially conduct a civil 
investigation (inquérito civil). However, the MPF’s civil investigations can 
benefit from investigations in the criminal and administrative spheres. Since they 
often relate to the same facts or actions, the investigative efforts of MPF 
frequently share similarities with the investigative efforts of the Internal Affairs 
Division of the Union (Corregedoria Geral da União, CGR), the arm of CGU in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141  Brazilian Supreme Court , RE 593727/2008 
142  Newspaper O Globo, PEC 37 é votada e rejeitada na Câmara dos Deputados, 25/06/2013. 
Available at http://oglobo.globo.com/pais/pec-37-votada-rejeitada-na-camara-dos-deputados-
8806597. 
143 Prado and Carson, supra note 14 (citing interviews conducted with CGU officials in April 
2014). 
144 Gustavo Gantois, “Gurgel: sem investigação do MP, ação do mensalão não teria existido”, 
Terra (11 March 2013), online: <http://noticias.terra.com.br/brasil/politica/julgamento-do-
mensalao/gurgel-sem-investigacao-do-mp-acao-do-mensalao-nao-teria-
existido,d3b5f2532da5d310VgnVCM5000009ccceb0aRCRD.html>. 
charge of administrative investigations. Similarly, civil and administrative 
investigations can feed into criminal investigations and vice-versa. Indeed, CGU 
has been working closely with the DPF in most of its operations.145 In such cases, 
while each institution may be focusing on a different aspect of the investigation, 
they can complement each other’s work.  
 
Two recent examples of this type of complementarity are the operations 
Two-Way Road (Mão Dupla), regarding a company hired by the government to 
build roads, and 13 of May (13 de maio), concerning the embezzlement of 
education funds by municipal officials. In the first case, in 2010, cooperation 
between the DPF and the CGU uncovered a scheme in which civil servants from 
the Department of Roads and Transportation of the State of Ceará accepted bribes 
from Delta, the company contracted by the Federal Department of Infrastructure 
and Transportation (DNIT) in exchange for allowing the firm to charge more for 
their services and to use lower quality materials than the ones specified in the 
contract. In the second operation, 13 of May, officials from the CGU and the DPF 
uncovered a scheme in which 26 municipalities in the state of Bahia were 
misappropriating funds from Fundeb, the national program to finance primary and 
secondary education. In most cases, civil servants and mayors had created shadow 
companies that pretended to sell services to the municipality (e.g., school buses, 
event organization services, etc.), but were actually redirecting federal funds to 
their own personal bank accounts.  
 
The expansion in high profile and widely publicized corruption 
investigations undertaken by Brazilian authorities in recent years and the 
heightened public awareness they have triggered represent notable changes in the 
country’s accountability processes, 146  and we hypothesize that these 
enhancements to the investigatory capacity of the country’s institutions are 
attributable, at least in part, to multiplicity. In the presence of multiple authorities 
able to pursue cases of suspected corruption, investigations have been launched 
into misconduct at all levels of the federation and across all branches of 
government as well as into private sector actors. However, we acknowledge that 
other factors have likely also contributed to these performance improvements and 
highlight in particular initiatives undertaken in 1998 and enhanced after 2003 to 
strengthen the DPF.147 With an increased budget, more personnel, a newly defined 
focus on corruption, and the systematic use of catchy names to gain publicity for 
operations, the DPF has become an increasingly potent force in fighting 	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corruption in Brazil. Nevertheless, it is noticeable that the increase in criminal 
investigations and operations at the DFP between 2005 and 2009148 was followed 
by an increase in civil investigations initiated by the MPF on corruption and 
administrative impropriety between 2007 and 2011.149 Although we cannot prove 
a causal connection, our hypothesis is that the strengthening of the DPF may have 
had a positive impact on the MPF’s performance and vice-versa.  
 
While multiplicity may result from having independent institutions that 
can conduct investigations which will lead to criminal corruption charges (inter-
institutional multiplicity), there is also some level of multiplicity in the fact that 
individual actors are independent to act within each of these institutions (intra-
institutional multiplicity). For example, while the previous section emphasized 
how the concentration and monopolization of authority in the TCU gives 
politically-appointed ministers the discretion to halt auditors’ inquiries into 
accounting or budget irregularities, individual prosecutors at the MPF are largely 
autonomous – if one prosecutor receives information concerning potential 
corruption and decides not to investigate the case, another prosecutor is free to 
proceed with the investigation. This lack of centralization – which we consider an 
example of intra-institutional multiplicity – has largely strengthened MPF’s 
power to act as an effective anti-corruption body.150  
 
2.2.3 Institutional Multiplicity in Punishment 
 
Multiple legal reforms over the past several decades appear to have been aimed at 
fostering institutional multiplicity in Brazil’s systems for punishing corruption. A 
core motivation in this regard has been the heavy burden of proof necessary to 
establish guilt in criminal cases. The Law of Administrative Improbity of 1992, 
enacted to expedite corruption cases and to empower the MP’s office as a body of 
horizontal accountability, allows prosecutors to choose between bringing civil or 
criminal charges depending on the amount and quality of evidence collected. As 
Arantes explains, this law provides an alternative to rather burdensome criminal 
trials as the burden of proof is lower in civil cases.151 Available civil penalties for 
individuals include the removal of a public official from office, temporary 
suspension of political rights, and reimbursement to the public coffers. 
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However, the 1992 reform did not produce the expected results, as the 
strategy required prosecutors to continue to rely on the Brazilian judiciary, an 
institution plagued by problems; since 1992, very few civil corruption cases 
brought have reached conclusion and resulted in sanction.152 Arantes argues that 
the fifteen years of evidence on administrative improbity cases “suggests that they 
are not entirely effective in the courts, whether as a result of the slowness of the 
proceedings, numerous dilatory appeals, or, frequently, judges’ concerns about 
MP’s authority to act in this arena, as when they fail to recognize the legal 
legitimacy of suits or the legality of procedures adopted during the investigation. 
Of 572 suits brought by the prosecutors in São Paulo since 1992, for example, 
fewer than 10 have reached a definitive conclusion to date.”153 Indeed, the 
average time for trying cases concerning administrative improbity was 
approximately 5 years in the regional federal courts, which is quite lengthy.154  
 
More recently, this picture seems to have changed significantly. In 2001, 
the CGU was created to “provide effective and efficient sanction of administrative 
misconduct by public officials while criminal investigations and prosecution were 
being processed in the federal judiciary.”155 Since its creation, the CGU has 
extensively expanded its jurisdiction. In 2001, the Secretariat of Federal Internal 
Control (Secretaria Federal de Controle, SFC), previously located in the Ministry 
of Finance, was incorporated into the CGU, and the CGU started operating the 
internal control of the Federal Executive.156 A year later, it incorporated the 
Office of the Ombudsman General (Ouvidoria-Geral da União), previously 
housed in the Ministry of Justice. In 2006, it created the Secretariat for Corruption 
Prevention and Strategic Information (Secretaria de Prevenção da Corrupção e 
Informações Estratégicas), becoming the central authority overseeing compliance 
with the Code of Conduct applicable to all federal public officers. The CGU is 
also responsible for coordinating the internal investigative units housed within 
each department of the federal government.157 
 
Independent of the civil and criminal sanctions imposed by the judiciary, 
the CGU, TCU, and internal accountability bodies can impose administrative 
sanctions on actors found to have engaged in corrupt activities. At the federal 
level, the law requires every department to have a unit responsible for conducting 	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administrative disciplinary procedures and to forward them to higher authorities 
when appropriate. Investigations are started ex officio or upon receipt of a report 
with credible allegations of misconduct. These units are responsible for 
submitting data and coordinating actions with CGU, which performs a subsidiary 
role: it initiates or intervenes in administrative investigations and disciplinary 
procedures in cases where the independence of the unit is questionable or when 
high-level authorities are involved. Between 2003 and 2014, the Administrative 
Disciplinary System of the Federal Administration (which comprises CGU and all 
these departmental units) dismissed 5,125 public officials for corruption or 
mismanagement, averaging 427 dismissals per year or more than one per day. The 
overall number of dismissals is significant, as it represents approximately 0.9% of 
the total number of federal government officials employed in 2014.158  
 
As discussed in Section 1.2, under the new Clean Company Act, 
corporations and other legal entities that become involved in corruption may be 
called before an administrative liability proceeding by the authorities of any 
affected government department or, in some cases, by the CGU. Penalties for 
corporate misconduct can include sizeable fines as well as potential debarment 
from public procurement. An illustrative example is the Gautama case.  
  
In July 2007, after an investigation uncovered fraud both in bidding 
processes and contracts with the federal government, the CGU debarred the 
constructing company Gautama from government contracting, and all 50 contracts 
in which audits revealed misconduct were suspended. In imposing the penalties, 
the Minister of the CGU publicly stated that administrative sanctions were the 
most effective method of punishing corrupt companies as well as in deterring 
future misconduct.159 In addition to the cancellation of existing contracts and 
debarment of the company involved in the scandal, the investigation also led to 
the resignation of one minister and the imprisonment of almost 50 people, 
including high level federal and state government officials, former members of 
Congress, entrepreneurs and employees of the construction company. It is 
estimated that out of the R$420.3 million (US$161.12 million) paid by the federal 
government to the Gautama Company, around 36.5%, i.e. R$153.4 million 
(US$58.8 million) was misappropriated by private parties. 
 
 In 2008, the CGU created the National Registry of Ineligible and 
Suspended Contractors, a public database that consolidates and disseminates 	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information on companies debarred from contracting with the federal or state 
administrations. Inclusion in the Registry was initially voluntary, but it became 
mandatory with the Clean Company Act. As of June 2015, 11,911 sanctioned 
suppliers and contractors were listed on the Registry, including some from the 
states and one from a municipality.160 
 
 A 2010 analysis of the effectiveness of the Brazilian judiciary in 
preventing and combating corruption revealed the apparent superiority of 
administrative procedures and sanctions in comparison to their conventional 
criminal and civil justice counterparts. Examining data on public sector 
dismissals, Alencar found that two-thirds of employees administratively 
discharged between 1993 and 2005 had been removed for reasons linked to 
corruption. 161  He further proved that while the majority of the discharged 
employees in his study (333 of 441) appealed their terminations to the judiciary, 
extremely few of those applications (4.53%) were successful. However, while 
administrative sanctions were infrequently overturned, they also rarely resulted in 
criminal charges or penalties; only one-third of officials dismissed for corruption-
related reasons were ever prosecuted, and the conviction rate in those cases – 
3.17% – was notably low.  However, the high and rising number of administrative 
sanctions imposed as well as the anecdotal evidence provide by the Gautama case 
suggest that CGU is one the most important institutions involved in the 
punishment of corruption-related offenses in Brazil today.  
 
However, authority to impose administrative sanctions is not limited to the 
CGU and individual government ministries. As an external oversight body, the 
National Court of Accounts (TCU) also has the power to impose fines or order 
other administrative penalties, including compensation for losses caused to the 
public administration, removal from office, temporary suspension of political 
rights, and debarment from public contracting, for corruption-related offenses. 
The TCU’s legal authority to apply sanctions for misconduct is particularly strong 
compared to autonomous audit agencies in other Latin American countries, 162 
and, in recent years, the institution has demonstrated an increased willingness to 
exert those powers. In 2006, the TCU disqualified 13 individuals from holding 
commissioned or trust positions and barred 23 firms from participating in 
competitive federal bidding, but by 2010, these figures increased to 103 and 109, 
respectively.163  	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However, Speck argues that the authority of the judiciary to hear appeals 
and possibly revise or overturn the TCU’s sanctions reduces their overall 
effectiveness.164 While acknowledging the need to protect against potential abuses 
of the administrative sanctioning system, Beck asserts that such judicial appeals 
are dysfunctional and disruptive, rather than salutary, to the process for two 
reasons. First, the standard for judicial review of the TCU’s decisions remained 
unresolved by the courts. The TCU functions as a tribunal, following procedural 
steps that are very similar as those that would be followed in a case brought 
before the judiciary. However, some cases argue that the judiciary can review the 
substance of TCU’s decisions, while others affirm that the review is only 
procedural.165 The dispute has generated much insecurity in the finality of TCU 
decisions, negatively impacting the effectiveness of such sanctions. Moreover, 
this dispute creates a somewhat higher rate of revisions than it would be the case 
if the judicial review was merely procedural. The second problem is time. As 
discussed below, the Brazilian judiciary generally operates at a glacial pace. As a 
result, many appeals take too many years to be decided, running against statutes 
of limitations or in some cases becoming moot (e.g, leaving of public office or 
death of the accused).  
 
While the orders of the CGU are also subject to judicial review, unlike 
TCU, CGU decisions are rarely overturned by the courts. When asked about the 
discrepancy, a CGU official indicated that they have hired a team of lawyers that 
make sure that every single step in the administrative process is in absolute 
conformity with the courts’ most recent proclamations concerning the scope of 
their review. In sum, CGU is “making the administrative processes bullet proof” 
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so as to minimize the changes of them being stricken down by courts 
afterwards.166  
 
Turning to the ultimate sanctioning authority in most corruption cases, the 
Brazilian judicial system displays “impressive institutional strength, illustrated by 
clear rules, impressive autonomy, and decisions that are widely adhered to by 
other branches of government,” but the courts “operate[] in an institutional 
framework that tends to delay clear, universally applicable, and binding policy 
decisions.”167 A 2012 report by a committee of experts under the Mechanism for 
Follow-Up on the Implementation of the Inter-American Convention Against 
Corruption (MESICIC) documents the judiciary’s poor rates of resolution in 
corruption-related cases168: 
 
 STF Regional federal courts 
# of complaints of acts of 
corruption and money laundering 
received 
4 229 
# of proceedings concerning 
corruption or money laundering 
resolved 
0 53 (30 final, with 14 defendants 
receiving final convictions and 3 
in which the statute of limitations 
ran) 
# of complaints related to 
administrative impropriety 
0 571 
# of proceedings concerning 
administrative impropriety resolved 
1 
(final) 
79 (4 final) 
 
The Brazilian judiciary’s underperformance relates not to sporadic errors 
in execution but rather to fundamental structural problems such as its excessively 
formalistic, burdensome procedural rules and corruption.169  Our discussion below 
focuses on two broad categories of factors that contribute to the overall 
inefficiency of the country’s sanctioning system: (1) lengthy delays in 
proceedings, and (2) overly rigid rules and procedures. 
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Turning first to the protracted pace of legal proceedings, the causes of the 
delays under the current system are manifold. First, there is a considerable degree 
of ineffectiveness and lack of rationality in management of the judicial system.170 
At the operational level, as of 2012, the judiciary was utilizing at least 210 
different, unintegrated computer systems, frustrating attempts at coordination or 
efficient administration.171 The National Judicial Council (Conselho Nacional de 
Justiça, CNJ) which was created in 2004 with the mandate of exercising external 
control over the judicial branch to ensure that the system operates morally, 
efficiently, and effectively, did successfully increase productivity in the courts by 
7.5% between 2009 and 2013; while these results appear initially promising, some 
officials within the CNJ have suggested that such gains in productivity reflect an 
organizational prioritization of simple, uncomplicated cases that shifts more 
complex cases (such as those involving corruption) farther down the list.172 In 
addition, as this article was being written, the CNJ had decided to abolish an 
electronic system created in 2007 for jurisdictional control, corruption prevention 
and transparency of the Judiciary, known as Open Justice (Justiça Aberta).173 
 
Beyond the problems facing the judicial branch’s management and 
administration systems, the courts are over-stretched by the excessive number of 
cases before them. Brazilian courts – even the Supreme Court – cannot select the 
cases they will hear, meaning that even meritless or frivolous cases have a right to 
a hearing; the lack of impediments to initial filings coupled with a paucity of 
extrajudicial means of dispute resolution (e.g., mediations, arbitrations) contribute 
to significant backlogs across the judicial system.174 The burden at the federal 
level is made excessively acute by the breadth of causes of action that can be 
“constitutionalized” and thus brought before federal courts. Even given the efforts 
of the CNJ to modernize the judiciary and prioritize certain types of cases, the 
total number of cases pending before the federal justice system rose from 7.6 
million in 2009 to 8.1 million in 2009. In 2010 alone, the Brazilian Supreme 
Court received 72,000 new cases.175  
 
Third, the appellate system is overly generous to defendants who can 
afford to pay for continuous appeals; if all the available remedies are used, a 
standard criminal proceeding has to exhaust four judicial instances in order to be 
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considered concluded and no longer subject to appeal (trânsito em julgado). 176 
Constitutionally, no sanction can be executed before a case is finally 
concluded,177 so the multiple levels of appeal allow defendants to drag out 
proceedings and thus delay punishment for years, if not decades (see discussion of 
the Collorgate case below). If defendants and their counsel adequately prolong the 
appellate process, the statute of limitations may toll, thus requiring dismissal of 
the case and precluding the imposition of any sanctions. In its critique of Brazil’s 
multiple appeals process, the 2012 MESICIC Report notes that it “contributes, in 
practice, to a final (not subject to appeal) judgment being virtually unattainable, 
often leading to the statute of limitations to run on cases and, consequently, 
impunity for those accused of acts of corruption.”178 The OECD Report presents 
criticisms along the same lines.179  
 
Beyond the lengthy delays that plague Brazil’s courts, the performance 
and efficiency of the judiciary is further undermined by the legal system’s 
excessively formalistic rules and rigid standards. Brazilian courts still follow so-
called positivistic doctrines, which impose a high evidentiary burden on 
prosecutors to interpret the law, resulting in a very low rate of corruption 
convictions. In addition to the formalism regarding the burden of proof, courts are 
also very strict in determining the admissibility of evidence. For instance, a high 
profile case, Operação Castelo de Areia, was dismissed by the Supreme Court of 
Justice (STJ), the second highest court in the country, because the recording of 
phone conversations was considered illegal. While the police had requested and 
secured judicial authorization to perform the recording, the judicial authorization 
itself was ruled illegal because the request was based on an anonymous lead 
which could not be considered grounds for a court of law to grant authorization 
for the recording. Such excessive procedural formality in the courts undermines 
the effective punishment of corruption in Brazil.  
 
The Collorgate case provides an excellent illustration of how deficiencies 
in the Brazilian judicial system weaken the overall accountability process. After 
his impeachment by Congress in 1992, former President Fernando Collor was 	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formally charged with three counts of corruption-related offenses, but multiple 
circumstances and factors allowed him to escape conviction or sanction in the 
courts. First, reflecting the protracted pace of resolution in the judicial system, the 
last decision in the Collor matter was issued on April 24, 2014 – more than twenty 
years after Congress launched a CPI into the scandal. Due to those delays, the 
statute of limitations expired on two of the three charges against the former 
president and had to be dismissed. Citing the prosecution’s inability to meet the 
high evidentiary requirements to prove personal wrongdoing, the Brazilian 
Supreme Court finally acquitted Collor of the third and final corruption charge,180 
although other individuals more directly involved in the scheme were convicted 
and sentenced.  
 
The Collorgate case offers an example of another troubling trend in the 
resolution of corruption cases in Brazil. While high level politicians and business 
leaders typically escape sanction for corruption-related offenses, their 
subordinates, who have often engaged directly in corrupt activities but only at the 
behest or for the benefit of their superiors, have often been held legally 
accountable for their misconduct. However, the 2013 Mensalão case represents a 
potentially significant shift in the assignment of culpability for corruption 
offenses.  In that case, the Supreme Court imposed vicarious liability on superiors 
who, by nature of their relationship with the acting party, could be assumed by the 
court to have ordered the subordinate to commit a criminal act. While this high-
profile case resulted in prison sentences for top-level officials and politicians 
being, it is too early to know how lower courts will incorporate the decision into 
their own jurisprudence.   
 
 
3. Institutional Multiplicity in the Brazilian Clean Company Act 
 
While there is a great deal of research exploring the system of accountability for 
the public sector in Brazil,181 there is almost no literature examining the system of 
accountability as it applies to private actors, especially companies operating 
abroad. This lack of scholarship is partially related to the novelty of the Clean 
Company Act, which has been in force for only a year and a half at the time of 
this writing (July 2015). Recognizing that the recentness of the Act makes it hard 
to provide empirical evidence about its operation and to assess its effectiveness, 
this section analyzes the Act’s potential. It builds on the idea that institutional 	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multiplicity is a desirable strategy in accountability systems (section 2.2.1 and 
2.2.2) to argue that the Brazilian Clean Company Act’s establishment of civil and 
administrative liability for legal persons is likely to provide more effective 
enforcement and punishment than the alternative of imposing criminal liability, 
which would have limited the authority over such cases to the judiciary.  
 
The Clean Company Act is not the first initiative to use institutional 
multiplicity in order to bypass problems with the Brazilian judiciary. 
Administrative bodies such as the TCU and CGU have long been searching for 
ways to impose administrative sanctions that take immediate effect and do not 
depend on judicial authorization to be enforced. While administrative penalties 
remain subject to judicial appeal, unlike criminal or civil penalties imposed by 
courts, such sanctions can be imposed while the judicial appel process proceeds; 
given the judiciary’s glacial pace, in the absence of an injunction, administrative 
sanctions may in place for a few years even if ultimately revoked. Indeed, the 
TCU has been concentrating more on imposing sanctions, such as removal from 
office and exclusion from public procurement, that can be made effective 
immediately and generate financial and reputational costs. 182  Similarly, as 
discussed earlier, the CGU has also been relying on immediately enforceable 
administrative sanctions. Considering the risk that such sanction may be reversed 
through judicial appeals, CGU has also ensured that the administrative procedures 
closely follow the requirements imposed by the judiciary, in order to reduce the 
chances of the decision being reversed.183 These efforts, which have been in place 
before the enactment of the Clean Company Act, seem to have proven effective as 
the number of administrative decisions reverted by judicial review has been fairly 
low.184  
 
Recognizing the success that this reliance on administrative sanctions for 
individuals has achieved in curtailing corruption in Brazil (especially when 
compared to the performance of the judiciary),185 the penalties for legal entities 
under the Clean Company Act are also primarily administrative in nature and thus 
deliberately avoid the judiciary as much as possible.186 It is interesting to note that 	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the Act offers a few innovations over the pre-existing systems of administrative 
sanctions. Perhaps most important is the strict liability clause, which largely 
reduced the burden of proof, consequently reducing the risks that the judiciary 
may reverse the administrative decision on evidentiary grounds. Also innovative 
are the comprehensive scope and broad definitions of the Act, as discussed in 
section 1.2 supra. This strategy reduces the risks of judicial appeals that rely on 
the narrowness of legal provisions and on a tendency for formalist statutory 
interpretation. Indeed, the Act made it very hard for the parties to rely on legal 
loopholes in order to avoid sanctions. These two innovations seem designed to 
address two important problems of the Brazilian judiciary discussed in section 2 
above.  
  
In sum, the hypothesis developed here is that the legislation’s heavy 
reliance on administrative investigation and sanctions was deliberate and designed 
to avoid the obstacles that one normally faces with judicial action in Brazil, 
especially in corruption-related cases. In doing so, the Act has relied on 
institutional multiplicity, incorporating some of the lessons learned in other 
spheres of the Brazilian accountability system while also bringing some 
interesting innovations. These institutional innovations may help overcome some 
of the obstacles that have prevented Brazil from effectively fighting corruption 
since its return to democracy.  
It is not only the substance of the provisions in the new Clean Company 
Act in Brazil that are innovative, but, as discussed  in section 1.2 supra, the 
statute also relies on a multitude of high level administrative organizations to 
conduct investigations and enforce such provisions. While this can be interpreted 
as a strategy to rely on institutional multiplicity, it may also involve trade-offs. 
Specifically, institutional multiplicity may exacerbate two of the problems that 
have motivated the creation of dedicated anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) in 
many countries: coordination problems and lack of expertise. Theoretically, the 
centralization of all anti-corruption activities into a single ACA should facilitate 
the sharing of information and intelligence, thus greatly reducing coordination 
problems, as well as allow managers and staff to gain specialized experience with 
and knowledge of the particular issues surrounding corruption.187 While ACAs 
have often failed to meet such expectations or to contribute meaningfully to 
corruption reduction, the challenges presented by coordination problems and lack 
of specialization loom over the institutional multiplicity strategy. 
While it may be advisable to keep related cases separate under certain 
circumstances, such as when dealing with different evidentiary standards, in other 	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cases there may be advantages in coordinating prosecutorial efforts. In the 
particular case of the TRT, 188  enhanced communication and collaboration 
between those conducting the civil and the criminal trials could have saved a 
significant amount of resources for the legal system.189  As a result of the 
simultaneous but non-integrated civil and criminal lawsuits in the Brazilian 
judiciary, there were more than ten different proceedings related to the TRT 
scandal pending before Brazilian courts as of May 2014.190 This is a result of 
what Machado calls the “compartmentalization of legal knowledge,” which 
demands that different spheres of the law (administrative, civil, and criminal) deal 
with the same set of events independently of each other, despite obvious 
interconnections.191 In the specific case of the TRT, this “compartmentalization” 
has been taken to the extreme, as subdivisions within each of the three spheres 
have led to an unnecessary repetition of proceedings, evidence, and production of 
documents in cases that have included criminal trials for the accused individuals, 
appeals of the administrative sanctions, civil restitution proceedings to recover the 
embezzled funds, and bankruptcy proceedings involving the company at the 
center of the scheme.192  
 
The lack of communication and coordination in the TRT case contrasts 
with the more recent examples of collaboration between the CGU and DPF, 
discussed in section 2.2 supra. Indeed, such cooperation seems to be building on 
the fact that the Brazilian courts have authorized sharing of evidence provided in 
the criminal and the administrative spheres. Thus, evidence collected by the DPF 
in the criminal investigation can be used by CGU in the administrative process, 
and vice-versa.193 Bolstered by institutional rules and structures that allow and 
facilitate such cooperation, the CGU and DPF have increased efforts to share 
evidence and collaborate on cases.  This type of coordination may not only reduce 
system inefficiencies, but can also enhance each entity’s individual capacity to 
fight corruption in its respective sphere, thus strengthening each institution’s 
ability to perform its own role effectively. In the particular case of the Clean 
Company Act, there are no explicit mechanisms to create or foster such type of 
coordination although such collaboration could be potentially useful when in 
corruption cases in which the police are investigating individuals, while the CGU 
is interested in pursuing administrative charges against an implicated company.  	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The lack of coordination is not only a problem in the judiciary. As 
discussed earlier, the individual independence of Brazilian public prosecutors can 
be perceived as a form of intra-institutional multiplicity that is advantageous for 
the accountability system as a whole. However, it may also lead to duplication of 
efforts and inefficient use of resources. Individual prosecutors may not 
communicate with other prosecutors working on different aspects of the same 
case, and they may also not share information about best practices that could 
potentially enhance efficiency.194 Thus, prosecutorial independence may also 
foster coordination problems that can ultimately impair anti-corruption efforts. In 
the context of the new Clean Company Act, the same problem may take place if 
the highest level of administration in different spheres of government (local, state, 
federal) decide to pursue investigation and/or prosecute the same case 
independently. As indicated, earlier (section 1.2 supra) the lack of a precise 
definition of the authorities that will be enforcing the Act may create multiplicity, 
but may also result in lack of coordination.  
 
An example of an initiative that tries to curtail such problems in the public 
prosecutor’s office is the State Strategy to Fight Corruption (Programa Estratégia 
Estadual de Combate à Corrupção, ECCO). ECCO won the Innovare Institute 
Prize for Best Strategy to Fight Corruption created by the Public Prosecutors 
office in 2013.195 ECCO provides individual prosecutors with a “toolkit of best 
practices” to adopt preventive measures to fight corruption. The use of the toolkit 
is discretionary, so the program does not impair the individual independence of 
prosecutors. Instead, the idea is that adoption of the tools by prosecutorial offices 
throughout the state will enhance efficiency by reducing the time each individual 
prosecutor needs to invest in order to determine the best course of action.  
Moreover, by providing prosecutors with a set of best practices, the toolkits foster 
consistency in prosecutorial criteria for adopting preventive measures, reducing 
both the risk and perception that prosecutions may be politically motivated. The 
initiative was well received: 75% of the offices of the MP in state of Rondônia 
have agreed to participate in the initiative. Unfortunately, there is no data on the 
effectiveness of the measures adopted by the individual offices. Neverthless, 
perhaps this initiative can serve as a model for the enforcement of the new Clean 
Company Act in Brazil.  
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From an institutional design perspective, these examples suggest that the 
supposed trade-off between independence and coordination can be addressed 
effectively through institutional malleability. Creating institutional structures that 
allow – but do not require – otherwise independent entities to coordinate when 
feasible and beneficial can encourage efficient and effective inter- and intra-
institutional collaboration while protecting organizational autonomy.  In the 
context of the TRT cases, if the legal system had maintained its existing 
institutional multiplicity with separate spheres for civil, criminal, and 
administrative cases but introduced an element of malleability to permit 
prosecutors from those arenas to share evidence to the extent practicable and 
helpful, resources could have been saved while the integrity of the system was 
upheld. The ECCO initiative offers another example of the benefits of combining 
institutional multiplicity with malleability: it provides the tools for coordinated 
action but leaves room for independent action as well.  
 
As the examples in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 illustrate, the effects of 
institutional multiplicity in oversight and investigation in Brazil have not been 
uniform, sometimes resulting in compensation, sometimes complementarity, and, 
in other cases, collaboration. This diversity reflects the existence of malleable 
institutional structures that permit but do not force coordination. The design of 
structures that encourage and nourish coordination when advantageous for the 
system as a whole is clearly a challenging task. Praça and Taylor provide a map of 
the evolution to the web of accountability institutions in Brazil suggesting that it 
has been characterized by self-reinforcing reforms in multiple institutions, which 
ended up generating what they call an “autocatalytic process of reform.”196 This 
may explain why there have been so many coordination efforts in Brazil in the 
last decade. While acknowledging their importance, exploring the mechanisms 
that may effectively promote productive coordination in other areas may provide 
lessons that will help making the enforcement of the new Clean Company Act in 
Brazil more effective. 
 
In this regard, it is worth mentioning that the Brazilian anti-corruption 
system has created a mechanism that has been particularly useful in enhancing 
institutional coordination and cooperation, the National Strategy to Combat 
Corruption and Money Laundering (Estratégia Nacional de Combate a 
Corrupção e Lavagem de Dinheiro, ENCCLA). Created in 2003 via Presidential 
Decree and located at the Ministry of Justice, ENCCLA was an attempt to 
coordinate the efforts of three branches of government, the Public Prosecutors’ 
Office and civil society to fight money laundering. After making significant 
progress in this area, its mandate was expanded in 2006 to include corruption, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 Praça and Taylor, supra note 75. 
changing the name from ENCLA to ENCCLA. ENCCLA promotes the exchange 
of information, fosters strategic cooperation among different institutions, and 
pushes for legislative and institutional reforms that can enhance collaboration.197 
While ENCCLA has been able to promote a great deal of cooperation at the 
strategic level, it has encountered barriers to do the same at the operational 
level.198 In sum, how to effective foster inter-institutional collaboration in an 
environment of institutional multiplicity is a topic that certainly deserves more 
attention, especially by those concerned with the effective enforcement of Brazil’s 
new Clean Company Act.  
 
If it is not possible to adopt robust efforts to improve coordination, there 
are reasons to support the idea that inter-institutional communication should at 
least avoid destructive or uncooperative behaviour. For example, while the 
relationship between the MPF and DPF and other investigative bodies can be 
collaborative and complementary, as described in section 2 supra, it can also be 
uncooperative. Indeed, there are cases in which fierce and unproductive 
competition between the two institutions has undermined overall investigative 
efforts.199 This shows that institutional multiplicity may also create coordination 
problems, and it may increase the risk of some actors undermining the functions 
performed by others. Thus, if malleable coordination such as that promoted under 
ECCO and ENCCLA is not possible, trying to avoid uncooperative and 
destructive behaviour may at least increase the chances of institutional 
multiplicity generating positive outcomes.  
 
It is important to note that a great deal of the advances achieved in Brazil 
in general and by ENCCLA in particular are due to the fact that specialized 
departments to combat money laundering and fight corruption have been created 
within the DFP, MPF, the Ministry of Justice, and other institutions. This begs the 
question about the advantages of specialization. Perhaps the clearest example of 
its advantages comes from the creation of special “judicial bancs” (varas 
especializadas), discussed in section 2.1 supra. Specialized judges seem to be 
able to process the cases much faster than generalist judges, who are often 
unfamiliar with the complicated laws governing money laundering. This initiative 
is often cited as an example of success, 200 suggesting that the enforcement of the 
Clean Company Act in Brazil could also potentially benefit from some level of 
specialization. However, it is hard to determine to what extent the specialization 	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in the judiciary alone is the sole factor that can possibly explained expedited 
decisions. Confounding variables include the specialization in the DPF and MPF 
(which may have generated claims based on more robust evidence) and a 
legislative change in 1998 that has defined money laundering as a stand-alone 
crime, rather than being defined in connection to a pre-defined list of criminal 
activities.201  
 
Based on the perceived success of the money laundering initiative, 
ENCCLA is currently advocating for the creation of specialized “judicial bancs” 
for corruption cases. 202  While this may be a promising development, it is 
important to note that such initiatives may be more likely to generate positive 
outcomes if they are structured as an option to the existing system, not a 
replacement of it. The separate judiciary created in Indonesia to analyze 
corruption cases (see section 1.2 supra)  may be an interesting experiment to be 
explored in the Brazilian context.  More specifically, it may suggest that there are 
advantages in specialization, but these are likely to be particularly promising if 
they do not exclude attempts to promote institutional multiplicity (i.e. there is a 
choice to bring the case to a specialized court or not). In other words, there needs 
to be malleability in specialization as well.  
 
As discussed in section 2.1 supra, institutional multiplicity may generate 
alternative avenues to perform each one of the accountability functions (oversight, 
investigation, and punishment), but it may also create problems. Both 
coordination and specialization may be undermined by institutional multiplicity, 
but this does not need to be necessarily the case. Indeed, Brazil provides a few 
examples of initiatives in which malleability has been used, and institutional 
multiplicity, coordination, and specialization were successfully reconciled to 
produce promising results. These lessons can and should be easily applied to the 
enforcement of the Clean Company Act to make it more effective.  
 
Conclusion 
 
There are three types of legal punishment that can be imposed on someone 
engaged in corruption in Brazil: administrative, civil and criminal. Each is 
determined by separate judicial or administrative processes that run independently 
from one another.203 The institutional multiplicity argument suggests that the 
independence among the processes might be positive: if one process is flawed, 
another may be able to compensate. As argued in this paper, the new Brazilian 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201 Brazilian Law nº 9.613/98. 
202 Prado and Carson, supra note 14 (citing Interviews conducted in April and May 2014). 
203 Brazilian Law nº 8.112/90, art. 125. 
Clean Company Act seems to be largely relying on institutional multiplicity to 
enforce sanctions against companies involved in corrupt practices in Brazil and 
abroad. Our hypothesis is that this may help the Act overcome some of the 
obstacles often encountered to effectively punish corrupt practices in Brazil. 
There are, however, no guarantees that institutional multiplicity will generate the 
benefits identified in this article. Indeed, it may actually generate inefficiencies 
with institutional duplication, destructive competition, and obstacles to 
cooperation and coordination. Whether the Clean Company Act will prove to be a 
positive or a negative example of institutional multiplicity remains to be seen.  
   
 
